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Accommodation in Linguistic Interaction. On the So-called Triggering Problem[1]

Abstract: Accommodation is a process whereby the context of an utterance is adjusted or repaired in order to maintain the default assumption that the utterance constitutes an appropriate conversational move of a certain type. It involves a kind of redressive action on the part of the audience and, depending on what the appropriateness of a speech act requires, results in providing missing contextual elements such as referents for anaphoric expressions, presuppositions, suppositions, deontic facts, pragmatically enriched contents, and so on. It remains to be determined, however, what is the source of the contextual requirements whose recognition motivates and guides the accommodating context-change. The aim of this paper is to address this question – which expresses the so-called *triggering* or *constitution problem* – and suggest that it can be adequately answered by a speech act-based model, whose central idea is that the requirements in question are structural components of patterns, scripts or procedures for the performance of speech acts.

The paper consists of four parts. Section 1 introduces the notion of accommodation and discusses three examples of accommodating phenomena. Section 2 develops a more elaborated description of the examples discussed in the previous section and proposes a list of questions

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that an adequate model of accommodation is expected to answer. Section 3 offers a critical examination of three alternative models of accommodation, i.e., David Lewis's score-keeping model, Robert Stalnaker's sequential update model, and Richmond Thomason's enlightened update model; in particular, it considers how they account for the constitution of contextual requirements that trigger and guide mechanisms of context-redressive changes. Finally, Section 4, suggests basic elements of a speech act-based model; it also argues that the proposed framework can be used to explain a wide range of accommodating phenomena and can shed a new sort of light on the constitution of accommodation-triggering requirements.

Keywords: accommodation, speech acts, presuppositions, common ground, conversational score

1. Introduction

Accommodation is a cooperative response to the requirements that the performance of a speech act imposes on the context relative to which the act is to be evaluated and interpreted; to put it differently, it is a process whereby the context of an utterance is adjusted or repaired so as to maintain the default assumption that the utterance constitutes an appropriate conversational move. Consider, for example, the following utterance:

(1) a. Jacqueline's getting married.
b. He's a soccer coach.[2]

The use of the anaphoric pronoun 'he' requires, for its appropriateness, that in the set of available referents there is a contextually salient male person to whom it refers. Knowing that 'Jacqueline' is a female name, however, we cannot regard it as a discursive antecedent providing information relevant for interpreting the token of 'he' under discussion. What is more, the discursive context of (1b) involves no explicit mention of a male person that could be regarded as a referent for this anaphoric expression. Nevertheless, the gap can easily be filled and the missing element can readily be provided; in other words, the context can be adjusted through accommodation so as to meet the requirement imposed by the anaphoric use of 'he'.

2 I borrow this example from Roberts (2015).

Taking into account the meaning of sentence (1a), namely, it is natural to assume that in uttering (1b) the speaker expresses the proposition that *Jacqueline's fiancé* is a soccer coach.[3]

Consider, by analogy, a situation in which a few passengers of a cruise have survived a marine disaster and found themselves on a desert island. Everybody is shocked. Only Jones keeps a cool head and, taking the initiative, says to Smith:

(2) Go and pick up wood![4]

Let us assume that Smith complies with what he is told and that next utterances of imperative sentences that Jones addresses to the survivors are taken to be binding orders. Note, however, that the appropriateness or felicity of an order *qua* an illocutionary act requires that the speaker stands in a certain authority relation to his or her audience. In particular, the felicity of the order made in the utterance of (2) requires that Jones has authority over Smith. Let us assume, however, that this requirement was not fulfilled prior to Jones's utterance. Does it make his order an Austinian misfire, i.e., an act purported but "null and void" (Austin 1962: 25)? Not necessarily. The context can be repaired by accommodation. More specifically, Jones's authority can be produced indirectly through a context-fixing mechanism guided by the assumption that his utterance of sentence (2) is *taken to be* and *takes effect as* a binding order.

Finally, consider a situation in which Phoebe utters the following two sentences:

(3) a. I cannot come to the meeting.
b. I have to pick up my cat at the veterinarian.[5]

Let us assume that prior to the utterance Phoebe's hearers had no idea whether or not she had a cat. Nevertheless, after hearing her words they are entitled to accept the proposition that Phoebe has a cat. The proposition, however, is not asserted but presupposed; more specifically, it is triggered by the possessive nominal phrase 'my cat' occurring in (3b), whose appropriate use seems to require that the proposition is part of the common ground relative to which the assertion made in uttering (3b) is to be interpreted. To meet this requirement, the common

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3 By saying that it is natural to assume this interpretation of dialogue (1), I do not mean that there are no other readings of this interaction — as well as of other interactions examined in this paper — available to different audiences. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this point.

4 This is a variation on an example originally discussed by J. L. Austin; see Austin (1962: 28); cf. Langton (2015: 2-5); Witek (2013: 154) and Witek (2015b: 14).

5 For a discussion of this example, see Stalnaker (1998: 9); von Fintel (2008: 144).

ground between Phoebe and her interlocutors – i.e., their "mutually recognized shared information in a situation in which an act of trying to communicate takes place" (Stalnaker 2002: 704) – is automatically updated or adjusted so as to accommodate the proposition that Phoebe has a cat.

Accommodation, then, comes in different forms. It involves "some redressive action on the part of the addressee" (Simons 2003: 258) and, depending on what the appropriateness of a speech act requires, can provide missing contextual elements such as referents for anaphoric expressions, deontic powers, and presuppositions.[6] It is not clear, however, what is the source of the contextual requirements whose recognition motivates and triggers the accommodating context-change. My aim in this paper is to address this question – which expresses the so-called *triggering problem*[7] – and suggest that it can be adequately answered by a speech act-based model, a central tenet of which is that the requirements in question are structural components of patterns, scripts or procedures for the performance of speech acts.

The remaining part of this paper is organized into three parts. Section 2 offers a more detailed discussion of the above-mentioned examples of context-redressive mechanisms and proposes a list of questions that an adequate model of accommodation is expected to address. Next, Section 3 discusses three alternative models of accommodation – i.e., David Lewis's (1979) score-keeping model, Robert Stalnaker's (1998, 2002, and 2014) sequential update model, and Richmond Thomason's enlightened update model[8] – and considers how they account for the nature and dynamics of accommodation as well as the constitution of the contextual requirements that trigger and guide mechanisms of context-redressive changes. Finally, Section 4, which is the concluding part of the paper, proposes basic elements of a speech act-based framework within which one might explain a wide range of accommodation phenomena; in particular, the proposed framework can throw a new light on the constitution of accommodation-triggering requirements.

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6 Laura Caponetto (in personal communication) and an anonymous reviewer have pointed out that elements produced or modified by context-redressive mechanisms — e.g. referents for anaphoric expressions, presuppositions, deontic powers, and so on — fail to form a homogenous class and, as the corollary of this, it is doubtful whether there is a universal accommodation process underlying all the phenomena under scrutiny. I do agree with this remark. I am far from saying that there is a common denominator underlying all the varieties of accommodating mechanisms considered in this paper. I claim, rather, that the speech act-based model offers a unified framework for *describing* the structure of accommodation phenomena; to *explain* concrete instances of accommodating mechanisms, however, one has to allow for the particularities of the language games within which they occur (for instance, for a discussion of accommodation of deontic powers in illocutionary games, see Witek 2013 and 2015b).

7 See Simons (2001: 431); von Fintel (2008: 138); Domaneschi (2017).

8 See Thomason (1990) and Thomason et al. (2006).

2. What we want to know about accommodation and are not afraid to ask

Following the speech-act theoretic tradition, let us assume that speech acts are "context-changing social actions" (Sbisà 2002: 421). For example, a binding promise changes a context in which the speaker is not committed to perform the act she predicates of herself into a context in which she is so committed; by analogy, a felicitous order changes a context in which the addressee is not obliged to perform a certain act into a context he is so obliged. According to the common-ground theory of assertion[9], in turn, a successful assertion updates the common ground with its propositional content, provided that the hearer accepts it, or at least with the proposition that the assertion has been made.

Viewed from this perspective, accommodation seems to involve a special kind of context-changing mechanism, which operates indirectly and implicitly rather than directly and explicitly[10]; in other words, it exploits what Rae Langton calls *back-door* methods[11] rather than direct or *official* mechanisms of context-change. For instance, the order made in uttering sentence (2) affects the context of its performance by adding to it the following three normative facts:

(4) a. Smith's *obligation* to pick up wood,
b. Jones's *right* to expect Smith to pick wood,
c. Jones's *authority* over Smith.

Note, however, that only facts (4a) and (4b) can be regarded as direct effects of Jones's order; by contrast, fact (4c) should be viewed as one of the deontic presuppositions of the illocutionary act under discussion. In other words, the felicity of Jones's order *qua* order *results* or *consists in* producing facts (4a) and (4b) and *presupposes* or *requires* fact (4c). If the requirement is not satisfied by prior context, it comes into being through a 'back-door' or indirect mechanism of accommodation.

Consider, next, the utterance of (1). Let us assume that it affects the context of its production – construed of as the common ground – by adding to it the following four propositions or contents:

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9 See Stalnaker (2002); for a critical discussion, see Abbott (2008).
10 For a discussion of indirect mechanism of illocutionary interaction, see Witek (2015b).
11 See Langton *forthcoming b*.

(5) a. Jacqueline's getting married.
b. [A certain contextually salient male person] is a soccer coach.
c. Jacqueline is getting married to a certain male person, who is her fiancé.
d. Jacqueline's fiancé is a soccer coach.

Proposition (5a) can be regarded as representing what the speaker of (1a) literally says. Content (5b), in turn, is the literal meaning of sentence (1b). It is not propositional, since it contains a procedural component "[A certain contextually salient male person]" which is the linguistically determined meaning of the pronoun 'he'; namely, according to the grammar of English 'he' can be used literally to refer to a certain contextually salient male person.[12] Proposition (5c) can be regarded as a bridging assumption whose function is to provide a discursive referent for the pronoun 'he' used in sentence (1b).[13] Proposition (5d), in turn, represents what the speaker says in uttering sentence (1b); more specifically, it results from interpreting the utterance of sentence (1b) – whose linguistically determined meaning is represented by (5b) – against the background of bridging assumption (5c). In sum, we can take contents (5a) and (5b) to result from literal interpretation of sentences (1a) and (1b), respectively; but the complete interpretation of the speech act made in uttering these sentences involves propositions (5c) and (5d) which are determined through accommodation: bridging assumption (5c) provides a discursive referent required by the use of pronoun 'he', thereby contributing to the determination of proposition (5d).

Let us also re-consider the situation in which Phoebe utters sentences (3a) and (3b), thereby asserting that she cannot come to the meeting and that she has to pick up her cat at the veterinarian. Provided that her interlocutors accept or ground her assertions, the common ground is updated with the following five propositions that are parts of the total content of Phoebe's utterance:

(6) a. Phoebe cannot come to the meeting.
b. Phoebe has to pick up her cat at the veterinarian.
c. Proposition (6b) explains proposition (6a).
d. The time of the meeting mentioned in (3a)

12 More specifically, the condition in square brackets is a *referential constraint* in the sense introduced by Kent Bach; see Bach (1987: 186-188; 2001: 33); cf. Witek (2015a: 19).
13 For a discussion of bridging assumptions and the role that they play in interpreting anaphoric expression see Wilson and Matsui (2012).

is the time of the visit at the veterinarian mentioned in (3b).

e. Phoebe has a cat.

Propositions (6a) and (6b) can be regarded as contents of two assertions that Phoebe makes in her utterances of sentences (3a) and (3b), respectively. Propositions (6c) and (6d), in turn, go beyond what she literally says and as such can be regarded as what she conversationally implicates. It is possible, however, to regard them as elements of linguistically determined meaning of the complex utterance (3). Following Asher and Lascarides (2003), one can assume that what makes (3) a coherent discourse is the fact that its constituent segments (3a) and (3b) stand in a certain rhetorical relation to each other, i.e., the rhetorical relation of *Explanation* reported in proposition (6c), and that their being so related evokes predictable "truth conditional effects on the content of the discourse" (Asher and Lascarides 2001: 202), e.g., the effect reported in proposition (6d). In short, propositions (6c) and (6c) can be regarded as determined by the semantics of rhetorical relations which constitutes an element of what can be called, following Asher and Lascarides, the *extended notion of grammar*[14]. Finally, proposition (6e) is what Phoebe *presupposes* or *supposes* in her utterance of sentence (3b). In fact, this presupposition – which is triggered by the possessive nominal phrase 'my cat' – is informative; according to some scholars – e.g., Robert Stalnaker, Kai von Fintel, and others[15] – the functioning of informative presuppositions is regarded to involve accommodation construed of as a mechanism whose job is to adjust the common ground so as to make the presupposition satisfied.

Generally, accommodation can be described as a mechanism whereby the context of a speech act is redressed – repaired and fixed or merely adjusted – in order to maintain the default presumption that the act is an appropriate conversational move of a certain type: a felicitous illocution, an appropriate act of anaphoric reference, a satisfied presupposition, and so on. In other words, the appropriateness of a speech act puts certain requirements on the context in which it is performed, and the recognition of these requirements triggers and motivates a cooperative response of the audience that results in an implicit and indirect context-change. This general description is true as far as it goes. In what follows, however, I would like to go further and consider the possibility of developing a comprehensive framework that might be

14 See Asher and Lascarides (2001: 210); cf. Chapter 6 of Lepore and Stone (2015), and a discussion of the idea of *extended semantics* in Witek (2016).

15 See Stalnaker (2002: 711), and von Fintel (2008: 140-141); for a critical discussion of the common ground account of informative presuppositions see Gauker (1998: 160-162), and Abbott (2008: 529-531).

used to allow for varieties of accommodating phenomena. Accommodation comes in many forms that can differ with respect to:

(i) the nature of their underlying mechanisms (e.g., accommodation can be construed either as a rule-governed process, a special case of cooperative transaction, or abductive intention-recognition inferences),
(ii) the kind of context that they affect (e.g., accommodated context can be represented either as a domain of normative facts, a universe of available discourse referents in the sense of the Discourse Representation Theory[16], or the common ground),
(iii) the kind of redressive action they involve (e.g., accommodation can involve either context-repair or context-adjustment),
(iv) the kind of inappropriateness that could ensue without it (e.g., accommodation failures can result in infelicitous illocutions, referential failures, unsatisfied presuppositions, and so on[17]),
(v) the source of the requirements whose recognition initiates and motivates the indirect and implicit process of context-change.

Therefore, it is reasonable to expect any adequate model of accommodation to address and answer the following five questions:

Q_1 What is the nature of accommodating mechanisms?
Q_2 What type of context does accommodation affect?
Q_3 What kind of redressive action does it involve?
Q_4 What sort of inappropriateness would ensue without it?
Q_5 What is the nature and source of the contextual requirements whose recognition motivates the accommodating context-change?

My aim in the next section is to discuss three received models of accommodation – developed, respectively, by David Lewis, Robert Stalnaker and Richmond Thomason – and consider how they address the above-mentioned questions. Before getting into the details, however, it is worth

16 See Guerts et al. (2016).
17 Of course this list of failures is far from being complete and requires further elaboration. For example — as Laura Caponetto has pointed out to me (in persona communication) — some illocutionary misfires result from referential failures or other semantic defects, whereas other misfires occur as a consequence of the speaker's lack of a required authority.

noting that question Q_5 is to be read as concerning the constitution of contextual requirements rather than their recognition, retrieval and processing; in other words, the question is *metaphysical* or *constitutive* rather than *epistemic*. The contrast between the constitutive and epistemic readings of a theoretical claim or question comes from Bach, who uses it to distinguish between two senses of the verb 'determine' occurring in statements of the form '*X* determines the content of utterance *U*'. On their epistemic reading, those determination-statements are to be paraphrased as '*X* ascertains the content of utterance *U*'; on their constitutive reading, by contrast, they are to be paraphrased as '*X* constitutes the content of utterance *U*'.

> Determination of the first sort is *epistemic* determination. It does not make it the case that an utterance has a certain content or, in particular, that the speaker has said a certain thing. Rather, it is what is involved in the hearer's figuring these things out, as well as what the speaker is communicating. *Constitutive* determination makes it the case that the speaker has said a certain thing and, more generally, that an utterance has a certain content. (Bach 2001: 29-30).

In what follows I assume that the requirements that the performance of a speech act puts on its context are part of the act's content. I also take question Q_5 to be constitutive rather than epistemic; I assume, namely, that to answer it – and thereby to solve the triggering problem – is to identify those aspects of (the structure of) a speech situation under scrutiny that *constitute* the requirements the recognition of which motivates the accommodating context-change. As Langton (2015: 1) puts it, in accommodation "what is said 'requires and thereby creates' what is required"; it remains to be determined, however, what is the source of the requirements in question: how they arise or, in other words, how they are constituted.

3. Three models of accommodation

3.1. Lewis's score-keeping model

A central idea behind Lewis's model of conversational dynamics – or, more accurately, of conversational kinematics[18] – is that *context* can be represented as *conversational score*.[19] The conversational score at a given stage of a language game is a sequence of abstract entities that

18 In personal communication Marina Sbisà has noted that conversational dynamics concerns utterances construed of as speech acts or actions, whereas conversational kinematics concerns utterances understood as moves made in a language game. Undoubtedly Lewis was interested in conversational kinematics rather than dynamics.

19 Lewis (1979); c.f. Kölbel (2011), and Langton forthcoming a, b; what Lewis calls *conversational score* can be to some extent likened to *conversational record* is the sense introduced by Thomason (1990) and further elaborated by Lepore and Stone (2015).

represent those aspects of the context of a speech act relative to which the act is to be interpreted and evaluated; it can also be defined as an abstract data structure whose function is to track and represent publicly recognizable contributions to the state of the conversation. These two complementary definitions capture two roles that the notion of conversational score is designed to play. First, it plays an interpretative or evaluative role in that score constitutes the background relative to which conversational moves are to be interpreted or evaluated; in other words, the conversational score at a given stage of a game constraints the scope of moves that can be appropriately made at this stage. Second, it plays a kinematic role in that it evolves in response to the moves made in the game.

According to Lewis, then, the score of a language game involves components that, first, are relevant for interpreting its constituent moves and, second, change in response to what happens during the game. They can be presuppositions shared by interlocutors, deontic fact or normative relations (e.g. commitments, obligations, rights, entitlements, and so on), discourse referents, rankings of comparative salience, standards of precision, and so on.

Lewis's key idea is that the kinematics of conversational score is a rule-governed process. He distinguishes between two types of what he calls 'rules of score-change' or 'kinematics rules': *rules of direct kinematics* and *rules of accommodation*. The former are constitutive in that they determine how moves of a certain type affect the context of their performance; in other words, they specify, for any move that can be appropriately made in the game, what would count as its target score. Therefore, move types – as well as the rules of direct kinematics that are constitutive of them – can be represented as functions from source-scores into target-scores. Rules of accommodation, by contrast, govern a process whereby the context of a move is adjusted so as to make the move appropriate; even though they can be represented as functions from scores into scores – more specifically, as functions from *defected* source-scores to *accommodated* or *repaired* source-scores – they do not play a constitutive role.

Lewis proposes the following general pattern for rules of accommodation:

> If at time t something is said that requires component s_n of conversational score to have a value in the range *r* if what is said is to be true, or otherwise acceptable; and if s_n does not have a value in the range *r* just before *t*; and if such-and-such further conditions hold; then at *t* the score-component s_n takes some value in the range *r*. (Lewis 1979: 347)

Accommodation, then, can operate only if certain conditions are met, e.g., if nobody blocks it.[20] It is also instructive to note that Lewis takes conversational moves to be acts of saying and takes the truth of what is said to be a designated aspect of its appropriateness. Of course Lewis allows for other forms of appropriateness. According to him, however,

> [w]e need not ask just what sort of unacceptability results when a required presupposition is lacking. Some say falsehood, some say lack of truth value, some just say that it's the kind of unacceptability that results when a required presupposition is lacking; and some say it might vary from case to case. (Lewis 1979: 739)

Nevertheless, in most of the cases of accommodation he considers it is the need to maintain the default assumption that what the speaker says is true that motivates the adapting context-change. Consider, for example, a master-slave game whose constituent moves can be described as Austinian exercitives, i.e. acts whose function is to enact new rules, norms and permissibility facts; exercitives presuppose also certain felicity conditions: they are "the exercising of powers, rights, or influence" (Austin 1962: 150). Let us imagine a master who says to a slave:

(7) You are now permitted to cross the white line.[21]

thereby exercising his power and creating a new permissibility fact or norm. According to Lewis, the mechanism underlying the production of this new norm involves accommodation. In other words, permissibility facts follow a rule of accommodation:

> If at time t something is said about permissibility by the master to the slave that requires for its truth the permissibility or impermissibility of certain courses of action, and if just before t the boundary is such as to make the master's statement false, then – *ceteris paribus* and within certain limits – the boundary shifts at t so as to make the master's statement true. (Lewis 1979: 341)

According to this rule, the context-adjusting process that results in creating new norms is motivated by the need to maintain the default assumption that whatever the master says is true.

Let us also consider a ceremonial act of naming a ship made with the help of the following explicit performative formula:

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20 For a discussion of blocking see Langton *forthcoming b*.
21 For a more extensive discussion of this example, see Langton *forthcoming a*.

(8) I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.[22]

The utterance of (8) affects the social context by creating a new conventional fact, i.e., that the indicated ship bears the name the *Queen Elizabeth*. According to Lewis, the production of this effect involves a process governed by the following rule of accommodation:

> If at time *t* something is said that requires for its truth that *X* bear name *n*; and if *X* does not bear *n* just before *t*; and if the form and circumstances of what is said satisfy certain conditions of felicity; then *X* begins at *t* to bear *n*. (Lewis 1979: 356)

According to the above-mentioned rule, then, the conversational move made in uttering sentence (8) should be regarded as an act of saying; what motivates the accommodating change is the assumption that what the speaker says is true.

In short, Lewis's account of exercitives and performatives is in a sense reductionist: he takes moves made in a language game to be acts of saying whose appropriateness consists in their being true. Consistently, Lewis accounts for the non-assertoric forces of utterances (7) and (8) in terms of indirect mechanisms of accommodation. In my view, in doing this he ignores the distinction between *openly made illocutions*, i.e. acts whose types are constituted by the rules of direct kinematics and represented as functions from source-scores into target-scores, and what Langton calls *back-door speech acts*, i.e., accommodation-exploiting acts that can be represented as functions from *defective* source-scores to *fixed* source-scores.[23]

Finally, let us consider Lewis's rule of accommodation for presuppositions:

> If at time *t* something is said that requires presupposition *P* to be acceptable, and if *P* is not presupposed just before *t*, then – *ceteris paribus* and within certain limits – presupposition *P* comes into existence at *t*. (Lewis 1979: 340)

If we assume that Phoebe's act of saying made in uttering sentence (3b) requires presupposition (6e) to be acceptable – i.e., to be part of the presuppositional component of the score – and that nobody blocks this presuppositions, it automatically becomes element of the repaired score. By analogy, let us assume that the utterance of (9) requires, for its appropriateness, presupposition (10):

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22 See Austin (1962: 116); cf. Langton *forthcoming a*.

23 For a criticism of Lewis's reductionism see Witek (2015b); for a defence and elaboration of the Lewisian model of illocutionary kinematics see Langton (2015).

(9) *Even* George could win.

(10) George is not a leading candidate.

If nobody objects by saying, for example 'Whaddya mean, *even*?'[24], then presupposition enters the conversation score. It is worth noting, however, that the 'back-door methods' exploited by accommodation have their limits. That is to say, even unblocked or unchallenged accommodation can fail to provide a required score component. Consider, for instance, the following utterance of sentence (11):

(11) Tonight, John is having dinner in New York, *too*.[25]

which contains the anaphoric presupposition trigger 'too'. Its appropriate use requires that the universe of available discourse referents contains a specific and contextually salient person (or group) who is having dinner in New York. If the discursive context of (11) involves no explicit mention of such a person, this gap can be filled with the help of an appropriate bridging assumption. However, if sentence (11) is uttered out of the blue, the available contextual information does not suffice to compute a required bridging assumption. Unlike the utterance (1) discussed in detail in Section 2, the utterance of (11) fails to create or provide what it requires for its success.

Lewis's score-keeping model suggests at least partial answers to some of the questions formulated in Section 2. That is to say, he claims that accommodation is a rule governed process or, more specifically, a mechanism guided or even mandated by rules of accommodation (question Q_1); he assumes that accommodation affects conversation score (question Q_2) and involves context-repair or context-fixing construed of as providing missing contextual components (question Q_3); he also takes the falsehood of what the speaker says as a designated form of inappropriateness that would result without accommodation (question Q_4).

It is worth noting that Lewis fails to address question Q_5. In other words, he says nothing about the source of the contextual requirements whose recognition initiates accommodation. No wonder, since he is interested in the *kinematics* of presuppositions and other score components rather than in their *dynamics*; that is to say, his main concern is to track trajectories

24 See Langton *forthcoming b*.
25 See Kripke (1990).

of context-changes rather than to account for them in terms of their underlying mechanisms and forces.

3.2. Stalnaker's model of sequential update

Unlike Lewis, Stalnaker limits his analyses to presuppositional requirements and presupposition accommodation. What is more, he represents context not as conversational score, but as common ground: a social object "definable in terms of the propositional attitudes of the members of some group" (Stalnaker 2014: 25). Nevertheless, the notion of common ground plays the role analogous to that of conversational score: first, it provides a background relative to which every new speech act is to be *interpreted*; second, it evolves in response to the speech acts made by the conversing agents as well as other manifest events they are mutually aware of. According to Stalnaker,

> [t]he notion of common ground in a propositional attitude concept. (…) it is a concept with an iterative structure: a proposition is common ground between you and me if we both accept it (for the purposes of the conversation), we both accept that we both accept it, we both accept that we both accept that we both accept it, and so on.
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> We can (…) define the individual propositional attitude of speaker presupposition in terms of common ground: An agent A presupposes that ϕ if and only if A accepts (for purposes of the conversation) that it is common ground that ϕ. (Stalnaker 2014: 25)

A key difference between Stalnaker's common-ground account and Lewis's score-keeping model is that Stalnaker claims that accommodation involves no rules of its own. He argues, namely, that:

> [a]ccommodation is an essential feature of any communicative practice. If common ground is (at least close to) common belief, then it will adjust and change in the face of manifest events that take place, including events that are themselves speech acts. Accommodation is just an example of this kind of change. (Stalnaker 2014: 58)
>
> A manifest event is something that happens in the environment of the relevant parties that is obviously evident to all. A goat walks into the room, or all of the lights suddenly go out. In such a case, it immediately becomes common knowledge that the event has happened (…). (Stalnaker 2014: 47)

The idea of speech acts as manifest events, then, plays a central role in Stalnaker's model of accommodation. For the sake of illustration, let us re-consider a situation in which Phoebe utters sentences (3a) and (3b). When sentence (3b) is uttered, it becomes a manifest event that a certain speech act with a certain set of properties has be made. In other words, it becomes part of the common ground among Phoebe and her interlocutors that in uttering (3b) Phoebe performs a speech act with (*i*) such and such a meaning and (*ii*) such and such a force; and (*iii*) presupposes that she has a cat; in other words, it becomes common ground among the conversing agents that Phoebe presupposes that she has a cat. According to Stalnaker, the later observation provides a key premise of a valid inference in the logic of common belief, whose conclusion is that the proposition that it is common ground among the agents that Phoebe has a cat.

It is not my aim to analyse and discuss the validity of Stalnaker's inference from the *premise* that it is common ground among the conversing agents that Phoebe presupposes that she has a cat to the *conclusion* that it is common ground among them that Phoebe has a cat.[26] My main concern in this paper is with the constitution of contextual requirements in general and presuppositional requirements in particular. Let us consider, then, in virtue of what properties (*i*), (*ii*) and (*iii*) of Phoebe's utterance of (3b) become manifest and as such are registered by the common ground among Phoebe and her interlocutors.

Let us assume that properties (*i*) and (*ii*) – i.e., the meaning and relational force[27] of Phoebe's utterance – are mutually recognized in virtue of the fact that the extended semantics[28] of the language Phoebe speaks is common ground. That is to say, properties (*i*) and (*ii*) are *constituted* by rules of the extended semantics and, because the rules are part of the common ground among Phoebe and her interlocutors, are manifest aspects of the speech event she has produced. It is natural to consider, however, what *constitutes* property (*iii*) as a manifest aspect of Phoebe's utterance.

One possible solution to the above-mentioned *triggering problem*[29] is that the presuppositional requirement is a semantically determined property of the possessive nominal phrase 'my cat'; more generally, according to the so-called semantic view, presuppositional

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26 See Stalnaker (2002: 709-711); for a discussion, see Simons (2003: 261-262).

27 The relational force of the utterance of (3b) with respect to the utterance of (3a) can be identified with the rhetorical relation that holds between them, and that rhetorical relations can be regarded as linguistically determined aspects of the logical form of discourse (see Section 2 above and Asher and Lascarides 2001 and 2003).

28 For a discussion of the idea of extended semantics or extended grammar – which involves, apart from the rules of lexical and compositional semantics, the rhetorical structure rules – see Asher and Lascardies (2001), Chapter 6 of Lepore and Stone (2015), and Witek (2016).

29 For a formulation of the triggering problem, see Simons (2001: 431).

requirements "are hardwired in the semantics of particular expressions"[30]. It is worth noting that elements of the semantic view can be found in Stalnaker's paper "Common ground" published in 2002:

> If it is mutually recognized that a certain utterance type is standardly used, in some conventional linguistic practice, only when some proposition is (or is not) common belief, it will be possible to exploit this recognition, sometimes to bring it about that something is (or is not) common belief, sometimes to create a divergence between a conventionalized common ground and what speaker and hearer take to be the beliefs that they actually hold in common. The phenomenon of presupposition accommodation, much discussed in the literature about presupposition, is like the phenomenon of conversational implicature in that it is an inevitable feature of any practice the point of which is to mean things. (Stalnaker 2002: 705)

In short, Stalnaker seems to posit the existence of conventional rules that define standard or appropriate uses of presupposition triggers in terms of contextual requirements; the set of such requirements, in turn, seem to make up what Stalnaker calls the *conventionalised common ground*, which in the case of presuppositional failures can depart from the actual common ground. What is more, the conventions of standard uses can be exploited so as to bring about communicative effects akin to conversational implicatures.

Nevertheless, in his book *Context* published in 2014 he claims that "(…) presupposition requirements may have diverse explanations" (Stalnaker 2014: 70). Commenting on examples involving the use of anaphoric presupposition triggers, he claims:

> The simplest and most common case where a presupposition is required by the use of a sentence is a case where the addressee can apply the semantic rules to figure out what the speaker is saying only if he has certain information. In a case like this, the semantic rules help to explain why a presupposition is required, but the rules themselves need make no mention of presuppositions. (Stalnaker 2014: 53)

In other words, the determination of presuppositional requirements functions against the background of semantic rules and conventions, but the rules and conventions themselves make no reference to presuppositions. For the sake of illustration, let us re-consider the situation discussed in Section 3.1, in which the speaker out of the blue utters sentence (9). Recall that in

30 Von Fintel (2008: 138); apart from von Fintel, the proponents of the semantic view are Heim and Kratzer (1998) and Domaneschi (2017). For a similar account, see Witek (2016), where I distinguish between rules of appropriateness, construed of as part of the extended semantics, and the Maxim of Appropriateness, understood as a pragmatic norm.

this case the available contextual information does not suffice to compute a bridging assumption that could help determine a required discursive referent. What is, however, the source of this requirement? To answer this question, Stalnaker (2014: 71) refers to Heim's idea that 'too' means in addition to *x*'; in other words, the linguistically specified meaning of 'too' determines that its use involves tacit reference to a contextually salient *x*. Therefore, semantics helps to explain *why* a presupposition is required. In the case under discussion, it indicates what kind of contextual information we need to determine what the speaker says. Nevertheless, semantics as such fails to determine *what* exactly is presupposed by the use of 'too' in (9); in general, the determination or constitution of properties (*iii*) – i.e., of presuppositional requirements – is a pragmatic process.

According to Stalnaker, then, the performance of at least some speech acts construed of as context-changers gives rise to a sequential update that involves two steps: (*a*) accommodation understood as a cooperative response to a manifest speech event, i.e., to the mutual recognition that a certain speech act equipped with certain properties is made; and (*b*) the production of the 'essential effect' of the act, e.g., adding its content to the common ground. Step (*a*) leads us from *prior* common ground to *accommodated* common ground, whereas step (*b*) takes use from *accommodated* common ground to *updated* common ground. What mandates step (*a*) is a principle that Stalnaker (2014: 46) calls the *norm of agreement*, which is a variant of the Gricean Cooperative Principle.

The sequential update model is designed to solve the problem of informative presuppositions. However, it runs into a further trouble, i.e., it gives rise to the so-called 'timing problem', whose discussion goes beyond the scope of the present paper[31]. Recall that my main concern is with the five questions formulated in Section 2. Let us consider, then, how they can be addressed and answered from the viewpoint of Stalnaker's sequential-update model.

According to Stalnaker, accommodation involves a process guided by general principles of cooperation (question Q_1) and affects context construed of as common ground (question Q_2); it involves context-adjustment rather than context-fixing[32] (question Q_3). Finally, Stalnaker (2014: 63) claims that inappropriateness resulting from accommodation failures comes in many different forms (question Q_4); he maintains, however, that this fact poses no serious theoretical problem, since *appropriateness* is a descriptive rather than explanatory category, i.e. we use it merely to describe surface phenomena requiring explanation.

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31 For a discussion of the timing problem, see von Fintel (2008), Simons (2003) and Abbott (2008).
32 See Stalnaker (2002: 711); I put a discussion of the repair/adjustment contrast off until Section 3.3.

Like Lewis, Stalnaker is interested in how presuppositions behave and how they are accommodated rather than in how they arise. That is to say, apart from a few rather vague remarks on the source of some presuppositional requirements – e.g., those associated with the use of anaphoric triggers like 'too' occurring in sentence (9) – he gives no definite answer to question Q_5.

3.3. Thomason's model of enlightened update

Underlying Thomason's model of accommodation is the idea that interpretation is a kind of abductive intention recognition. He takes the intention behind a given act to be a complex information structure that involves (*a*) a goal, i.e., a state of affairs to be achieved, (*b*) a plan, i.e., a partially specified way of achieving the goal, and (*c*) preconditions, i.e., ways that the world is assumed to be, on which the achievement of the goal according to the plan depends.

Taking into account the structure of action-underlying intentions, we can describe an acting agent, first, as performing a certain public action, which is individuated by reference to the goal mentioned in (*a*), and, second, as making a series of tacit though publicly recognizable actions, which can be viewed as his or her undertaking a commitment or making a supposition that the preconditions mentioned in (*c*) are met. For example, a speaker who utters sentence (12):

(12) Susan regrets that she bought a ferret.[33]

can be described as performing a *public action* of asserting that Susan regrets that she bought a ferret and a *tacit* though *publicly recognizable action* of supposing or committing herself to the claim that Susan bought a ferret.

Viewed from the perspective of the above-mentioned model of interpretation as intention recognition, accommodation is "a special case of obstacle elimination" (Thomason 1990: 343) and involves a kind of "enlightened update" (cf. Thomason et al. 2006). For the sake of illustration, let us re-consider the utterance of sentences (1a) and (1b). The hearer recognizes that the goal behind the speaker's utterance of (1b) is to assert that a certain male person is a soccer coach or, more precisely, to refer to a certain contextually salient male person and predicate the property of *being a soccer coach* of him. The hearer also recognizes that one of

33 I borrow this example from Craig Roberts; see Roberts (2015).

the preconditions for the achievement of this goal is that the universe of available discourse referents contains such a contextually salient object; however, he is also aware of the fact that the discursive context involves no explicit mention on a male person who could function as the referent for the anaphoric pronoun 'he' occurring in (1b). Being a cooperative interlocutor, however, he adopts the goal of eliminating this recognized obstacle and, consequently, accommodates the speaker by computing an appropriate bridging assumption that provides the missing referent and thereby repairs the context. Consider, by analogy, a situation in which prior to the utterance of (12) the hearer had no idea that Susan bought a ferret. He recognizes, however, that one of the preconditions for the achievement of the speaker's goal – namely, her asserting that Susan regrets that she bought a ferret – is that the proposition expressed by (13):

(13) Susan bought a ferret.

is part of the common ground of the conversation. Being a cooperative interlocutor, he adopts the goal of making this precondition satisfied and, consequently, accommodates the speaker by accepting her supposition that the proposition expressed by (13) is part of the common ground of the conversation. In short, to accommodate the speaker is to make the recognized preconditions for the achievements of her identified goals satisfied.

It is wort noting that Thomason's model allows us to view utterances (1) and (12) as initiating two different types of context-redressive actions. The mechanism that provides the missing discursive referent for 'he' in (1b) can be best understood as a case of context-repair; in other words, it involves accommodation of presuppositions understood as requirements put on prior context. By contrast, the process that results in updating the common ground with the proposition expressed by (13) is to be understood as a case of context-adjustment; that is to say, it involves accommodation of suppositions rather than presuppositions. As Craig Roberts observes, *projective contents*[34] triggered by factive verbs and possessive nominal phrases – e.g., 'regret' in (12) and 'my cat' in (3b), respectively – are suppositions rather presuppositions; in other words, the appropriate use of the above-mentioned triggers does not require that the prior common ground entails the propositions expressed, respectively, by (13) and (6e), but that these propositions are not at issue relative to the current question under discussion[35].

34 What makes these contents *projective* is that they persist in a number of embedding contexts, e.g., under negation, interrogation, a modal auxiliary, and so on. For a discussion, see Roberts (2015).

35 Roberts take questions under discussion to constitute one of the evolving components of conversational score; see Roberts (2015).

In short, sentence (1b) is uttered in a context that fails to satisfy the requirements put by the use of 'he' and, in this connection, is defective; that is why it needs repairing or fixing. By contrast, even though prior to her utterance of sentence (3b) Phoebe's interlocutor had no idea that she had a cat, her use of 'my cat' is appropriate as long as the proposition expressed by (6e) is not at issue relative to the current question under discussion. The same holds for the above-discussed utterance of (12): provided that the projective content expressed by (13) is not at issue relative to the current question under discussion, the use of 'regret' in (12) is appropriate no matter whether the hearer did or did not know that Susan had bought a ferret. Examples (3) and (12), then, involve accommodation understood as context-adjustment rather than context-repair: that is why the speakers' suppositions are accepted by the hearers "quietly and without fuss" (von Fintel 2008: 141).

Thomason, Stone and DeVault note that the above-presented account does not give rise to the problem of informative presuppositions. Therefore, we can give up the Stalnakerian idea of *sequential update* and replace it with the notion of *enlightened update*. Roughly speaking, it applies to cases "where the conversation moves forward not just through the positive effects of interlocutors' utterances but also from the retrospective insight interlocutors gain about one anothers' mental states from observing what they do" (Thomason et al. 2006: 5). In other words, enlightened update involves recognition and adoption of the speaker's tacit though publicly recognizable commitments. According to Thomason, Stone and DeVault,

> [i]nformative presupposition arises as a problem in the presence of a pragmatic rule requiring an utterance involving a presupposition to be appropriate only if its presuppositions are mutually supposed at that stage of the conversation. We are not committed to such a rule; the alternative rules (…) would rather be (1) that an utterance involves a presupposition *P* if the intention underlying the utterance is committed to the presupposition, and (2) that an utterance is only appropriate to the extent that its presuppositions can be recognized and added to the common ground. (Thomason et al. 2006: 33)

Thomason also claims that accommodation is responsible for at least some of the interpretive effects that are traditionally described as conversational implicatures. Let us consider, for instance, Grice's *garage* example. Imagine a situation in which *A* is standing by an obviously immobilized car and is approached by *B*; the following talk-exchange takes place:

(14) *A*: I'm out of petrol.

B: There is a garage around the corner.[36]

According to a standard Gricean reading of this example, in saying (*i*) that there is a garage around the corner *B* implicates (*ii*) that the indicated garage is open and has petrol to sell; in other words, content (*ii*) is worked-out through a pragmatic, maxim-guided inference. Viewed from the perspective of the enlightened update model, however, content (*ii*) can be regarded as determined by accommodation; more specifically, *A* recognizes that that the goal behind *B*'s utterance is to help him to find fuel, and that one of the preconditions for the achievement of this goal is that content (*ii*) is true or at least that *B* undertakes a tacit though publicly recognizable commitment to its truth.

Following Roberts, then, we can distinguish between three types of accommodation.

First, there are cases that, like (3b) and (12), involve context-adjustment rather than context-repair. They are associated with the use of projective content triggers and explicit expression of what is to be accommodated; the projective content is not presupposed, but supposed or taken for granted without being asserted; the accommodating mechanisms are linguistically mandated (i.e., triggered by the use of certain expressions or constructions) and linguistically controlled (i.e., the projective content is explicitly represented in the uttered lexical material).

Second, there are cases that, like (1) and (11), involve context-repair or context-fixing. They are associated with the use of presuppositional triggers that put conventional constraints on the kind of context in which they can be felicitously used; the accommodating mechanisms involved here are linguistically mandated, but are not linguistically controlled.

Third, there are cases that, like (14), involve the enrichment of the linguistically encoded meaning of an utterance. They are not associated with the use of overt triggers; their interpretation involves recognising and adopting preconditions abductively inferred to make sense of why and how the speaker is saying what she is saying; the accommodating mechanisms underlying such cases of *free enrichment* are neither linguistically mandated nor linguistically controlled.

Finally, let us consider how the enlightened update model addresses and elaborates on the triggering or constitution problem. It is instructive to note, first, that within the framework proposed by Thomason it takes the form of the following question: "What determines

36 Grice (1989: 32); cf. Thomason (1990: 347).

preconditions (i.e., private commitments and tacit actions) as parts of speakers' intentions?" One possible answer suggests that at least in some cases the preconditions can be determined by what Thomason calls the 'grammar':

> (…) the grammar might require a speaker to commit to certain information, privately, but in a publicly recognizably way, WITHOUT thereby requiring the speaker to somehow treat it as public, prior information. This gives an attractive way to resolve the well-known and frequent gaps where information must be grammatically backgrounded but need not be shared information among interlocutors. Classic examples include the informative presuppositions of change-of-state verbs, factives, and definite noun phrases. (Thomason et al. 2006: 6)

It is worth noting, however, that this *grammar-based* solution works only for cases of supposition accommodation that, like in examples (3b) and (12), involve linguistically mandated and linguistically controlled process. It remains to be considered, then, what determines the tacit actions involved in other types of accommodation. i.e., in accommodation of presuppositions and accommodation of enriching contents.

Let us conclude by gathering Thomason's answers to the five question formulated in Section 2. According to the enlightened update model, accommodation is cooperative process of obstacle elimination (question Q_1) and involves, depending on particular cases, either context-adjusting, context-fixing or content-enrichment (question Q_3); it can affect context construed of as conversational score, whose components represent presuppositions, universes of discursive referents, and so on (question Q_2). The model under discussion is also pluralistic with respect to forms of inappropriateness that could result in cases of accommodation failures (question Q_4). Finally, it suggests that at least in some cases the contextual requirements whose recognition motivates accommodating context-changes are determined by the grammar (question Q_5).

4. Conclusions. Towards a speech act-based framework

Let us summarize the results of the previous sections. Recall, first, that we expect an adequate model of accommodation to answer a number of questions, some of which are listed in the concluding part of Section 2. They concern the nature and varieties of accommodating mechanisms (question Q_1), the sorts of contexts that they affect (question Q_2) and the kinds of redressive actions they involve (question Q_3), as well as the sorts of inappropriateness that would result from accommodation failures (question Q_4). In particular, we are interested in

developing a comprehensive framework for explaining the constitution of the contextual requirements whose recognition motivates and triggers the accommodating context-changes (question Q_5); that is to say, we want to know what is the source of the requirements in question or, in other words, how they arise. This is the (in)famous triggering problem. The discussion presented in Section 3 suggests that the problem has not found a satisfactory solution yet. Lewis does not appear to address it at all. Stalnaker, even though in some parts of his works he seems to embrace the so-called semantic view – according to which contextual requirements on the appropriate use of prepositional triggers are semantically or conventionally determined – officially rejects it and claims that presupposition requirements have diverse, mostly pragmatic explanations. Thomason suggests that the requirements whose recognition initiates accommodation can be accounted for in terms of preconditions construed of as elements of action-underlying intentions or, more specifically, in terms of tacit though publicly recognizable actions or commitments that agents perform or undertake as part of their intentions to achieve certain goals in accordance with certain plans; but this suggestion, as it stands, needs further elaboration.

I am sympathetic to the idea that the contextual requirements whose recognition initiates accommodating mechanisms are built into the structure of our communicative plans and intentions. I also agree that at least in some cases – especially the ones that involve the use of such triggers as factive verbs, possessive noun phrases, and so on – the requirements in question are determined by what Thomason calls the 'grammar'; more precisely, the not-at-issue projective contents (6e) and (13) can be regarded as conventionally or semantically determined properties of sentences (3b) and (12), respectively. However, a similar explanation applies neither to cases involving anaphoric triggers, whose processing requires linguistically mandated though linguistically uncontrolled processes, nor to cases involving no overt triggers, whose processing involves free enrichment. What is more, it cannot be directly applied to the examples of illocutionary acts made in uttering sentences (2) and (7), i.e., to accommodating mechanisms that result in creating authority and permissibility facts, respectively.[37]

My hypothesis is that the contextual requirements in question – which, depending on particular cases, can be described as presuppositions, not-at-issue assumptions, discursive referents, preconditions, tacit commitments, and so on – are determined by rules of appropriateness for the performance of certain acts, i.e., by rules that define the appropriateness

[37] What is more, it is doubtful whether the production of permissibility facts by exercitive illocutionary acts involves accommodation at all; for a defence of such a Lewisian account of the functioning of illocutionary acts, see Langton (2015); for a critical discussion, see (Witek 2015b).

of conversational moves made in a given language game in terms of their *source scores*. In other words, following Lewis I assume that the appropriateness rules determine, for any stage of the game, what would count as a correct move at this stage. What is more, provided a given move is taken by default to be appropriate, they help us determine and recognise its contextual requirements and preconditions.[38]

It is instructive to note, following Sbisà (forthcoming), that in speech act theory there are to alternative approaches to the study of appropriateness rules. For the sake of the present paper let us call them the *Complete System View* and the *Incomplete System View*. According to the former, the set of appropriateness rules for the performance of acts of a given type is complete; therefore, it can be represented as part of a comprehensive list of necessary and collectively sufficient conditions for the performance of acts of this type. An example of the Complete System View is Searle's (1969) theory of illocutionary acts. According to the Incomplete System View, by contrast, the set of appropriateness rules for the performance of acts of a certain type is incomplete and open; therefore, even though we can explicitly formulated some of them, the resulting list is not closed. A classical formulation of the Incomplete System View can be found in Austin's lectures *How to Things with Words*[39]. As Sbisà notes, unlike Searle, Austin does not present his rules A, B, and Γ "as (templates for) jointly sufficient conditions, but leaves the performance of illocutionary act tokens open to unforeseen forms of defeasibility" (Sbisà *forthcoming*).

The speech act-based model proposed in this section is a variant of the Incomplete System View. I assume that studding breakdown cases we can discover new appropriateness conditions and thereby new requirements whose recognition can initiate accommodating mechanisms of context-change. As L. W. Forguson notes, the method of studding breakdown cases comes from Austin, who used it to justify his distinction between phatic, rhetic, locutionary, and illocutionary acts: "though they are merely abstractions from the fully happy, felicitous speech act, in 'breakdown' situations what is normally an abstraction may exist as an act in its own right to be ascribed to the speaker" (Forguson 1973: 165). In other words, "[a]lthough breakdowns may rarely occur in everyday speech situations, it is important to investigate them" (Forguson 1973: 171). In particular, studding them we can recognize new

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38 It is instructive to stress that the proposed speech act-based approach does not presupposes that there is a common denominator underlying all the varieties of accommodating phenomena. What it offers is a general patterns for their description rather than explanation. As an anonymous reviewer has pointed out, it is doubtful whether accommodation can receive a clear general account. In my view, accommodating phenomena comes in many different forms whose adequate explanation requires allowing for the particularities of the language games within which they occur. (see footnote 9 above and the discussion of the Incomplete System View below).

39 See Austin (1962); cf. Forguson (1973).

rules of appropriateness and unforeseen requirements that the performance of a speech act puts on its context.

A central idea behind the proposed speech act-based model is borrowed from Sbisà, who in her paper "Varieties of speech act norms" suggests that mechanisms underlying accommodation involve pattern-recognition and are guided by default assumptions of appropriateness. Like Stalnaker, Sbisà rejects Lewis's idea of accommodation as a rule-governed mechanism. Accommodation, she claims, involves no rules of its own. Unlike Stalnaker, however, she seems to take the idea of appropriateness to play a key role in determining the requirements the recognition of which can motivate context-redressive actions. In other words, accommodation functions against the background of speech act norms and rules, some of which are rules of appropriateness.

> Accommodation, then, is (…) governed by general principles, one of which concerns pattern recognition (a pattern can well be recognized from the presentation of some of its parts) and the other the by-default recognition of other minds or subjects. (…) It is indeed quite obvious that a pattern that is partially presented may be completed by the observer if the part presented suffices to make it emerge. (Sbisà *forthcoming*.)

> The existence of shared patterns of conventional action (which are cultural facts and can be expected to be linguistically encoded at least up to a certain point) could account for the "accepted conventional procedure" of Austin's rule A1 without binding us to an obsessionally rule-governed view of how illocutionary acts are performed. Moreover, patterns may be cognitively processed in different ways, for example by means of Gestalt-like mechanisms, but also, if needed (as in the case of unfamiliar patterns, gravely incomplete display, and other complications), inferentially, which would assign a legitimate role to inferential theories of illocutionary force understanding. (Sbisà 2009: 48-49)

The above-mentioned ideas of pattern recognition and open systems of appropriateness rules can be used to fill the gap in the enlightened update model. Recall that according to Thomason action-underlying intentions are complex information structures that involves goals, plans and preconditions. My hypothesis is that the rules or appropriateness are built into the structure of such intentions and correlate goals and plans with the precondition of their achievement. Viewed from this perspective, accommodation involves, first, default evaluation of the speaker's utterance as an appropriate act of a certain type – i.e., as the act that achieves its goal construed of as either Austin's conventional effect or Searle's illocutionary point – and, second,

the tacit assumption that all preconditions for the achievement of this goal are met (see Lewis's *ceteris paribus* condition).

How many rules of appropriateness are there? This is an empirical question that should be addressed and answered by studding breakdown cases. Taking into account the examples discussed in this paper, however, we can identify at least some of them. For example, there is a rule according to which the appropriate use of an anaphoric trigger requires that in the universe of available discourse referents there is a contextually salient individual of a certain sort (see examples (1) and (11)); another rule says that the appropriate use of such projective content triggers as possessive nominal phrases and factive verbs require that the propositions they contribute are not-at-issue relative to the current question under discussion (see examples (3) and (12)); next, the appropriateness of an act of providing one's interlocutor with information that can help him achieve his signalled goals is that the conveyed information is sufficiently rich (see example (14)); finally, the felicity of an order requires that the speaker stands in an appropriate authority relation to her audience (see example (2)). One can also assume – in accordance with Lewis's reductionist model criticised in Section 3.1 above – that the appropriateness of explicit performative utterances, as well as that of exercitives made in uttering indicative sentences about permissibility facts, consists in their being true (see examples (7) and (8)).

In sum, according to the proposed speech act-based model, accommodating mechanisms involve cognitive capacities akin to pattern-recognition (question Q_1) and can affect different components of conversational score (question Q_2); depending on particular cases, they can involve either context-repair, context-adjustment or free-enrichment (question Q_3). Accommodation failures can result in various forms of inappropriateness that should be examined by focussing on what Forguson calls breakdown cases (question Q_4). Finally, contextual requirements whose recognition motivates the accommodating context-changes are determined by schemas and patterns that constitute the structure of plans and intentions, where the schemas and patterns can be described in terms of rules of appropriateness constituting Austinian procedures.

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