Czynności illokucyjne jako akty interakcyjne (Illocutionary Acts as Interactional Actions). Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria, 19(3), 2010, 359-390.

Abstract

In this paper, I challenge the traditional assumption that illocutionary acts of the same type are homogeneous with respect to the factors that determine their illocutionary force. I identify a fundamental dispute between Austinian and Gricean traditions: Austinians treat basic illocutionary acts as essentially conventional, while Griceans view them as fundamentally communicative, driven by speaker intentions. I propose an alternative framework grounded in the idea of heterogeneity: illocutionary force varies across instances of the same type because it depends on different kinds of interactional effects. Central to this approach is the concept of interactional effect—the specific change in the listener’s behavior, thoughts, or actions that an utterance brings about within a social interaction. I argue that this interactional effect, whether rooted in conventional patterns or in the speaker’s intentions, better explains the illocutionary force of speech acts. I situate this framework within broader debates on speech-act theory and outlines its methodological implications.