Publications
In English
- Marta Wąsik, Maciej Witek Illocutionary Competence in Irony Comprehension: Insights from Empirical Studies on ASD. Analiza i Egzystencja, 72, 2025, 5–37. illocutionary competence irony comprehension compliments criticisms illocutionary negation In this paper, we offer a pragmatic analysis of utterances used in empirical studies on irony comprehension in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Specifically, we focus on three studies that examine the understanding of ironic compliments and criticisms. Our central argument is that interpreting these utterances requires substantial illocutionary competence, alongside mindreading abilities, both of which are essential for social cognition and interaction. After exploring how different types of compliments and criticisms are performed and comprehended, we argue that irony functions as an illocutionary negation, transforming the literal force of an utterance (it would have, if taken literally) into its opposite. Our key conclusion underscores the importance of interpreting empirical findings on irony comprehension through the lens of potential differences in illocutionary competence among participants and the ability to interpret the echoic and meta-illocutionary functions of irony. Tue Nov 25 2025 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Gricean insinuation and the fake one-way mirror effect. Synthese, 204, 96, 2024. insinuation deniability indirect speech communicative intentions common ground The insinuating speaker, when successful, achieves two goals: they introduce a contentious content into a conversation while simultaneously marking it as not being officially stated. This positioning allows the speaker to plausibly deny any intention behind the implied message when challenged. I argue that reconciling the communicative nature of insinuation and its off-record status within the Gricean framework of overt communication appears to present a significant conceptual puzzle. In this paper, I address this challenge by introducing the notion of Gricean insinuation, which I define as communication that is both partially overt and partially covert. I start by exploring the nature and complexity of the insinuation puzzle mentioned earlier and reviewing two existing Gricean solutions to it. Then, I proceed to analyse three concepts relevant to the insinuation phenomenon: indirectness, cancellability, and plausible deniability. Following this, I introduce the concept of Gricean insinuation. In particular, I use the common ground framework to elucidate what I refer to as the ‘Fake One-Way Mirror Effect’, and apply the resulting model to explain some examples of insinuation as acts of off-record communication. In conclusion, I assess the model’s effectiveness and propose directions for future research. Fri Aug 30 2024 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Marcin Lewiński, Bianca Cepollaro, Steve Oswald, Maciej Witek Norms of Public Argument: A Speech Act Perspective. Topoi, 42(2), 2023, 349-356. speech act theory public argument normativity argumentation harmful speech pragmatics This editorial introduces the <i>Topoi</i> special issue <i>Norms of Public Argument: A Speech Act Perspective</i>, which brings together recent work at the intersection of speech act theory, pragmatics, and argumentation theory. The issue explores how norms govern public disputes and reasoning, how speech acts enact and transform normative relations, and how linguistic practices can both sustain and undermine democratic discourse. Contributions by Mitchell S. Green, Neri Marsili, Grzegorz Gaszczyk, Grace Paterson, Mary Kate McGowan, Giles Howdle, Kyle Adams, Cousens, Álvaro Domínguez-Armas, Andrés Soria-Ruiz, Marcin Lewiński, Felix Bräuer, Amalia Haro Marchal, Cristina Corredor, van Berkel and Wagemans, and Shiyang Yu and Frank Zenker examine foundational speech acts, normatively problematic discourse, and argumentation-theoretic issues. Collectively, the papers demonstrate how contemporary speech act theory can illuminate the norms, pathologies, and repair mechanisms of public argument across institutional, political, and everyday contexts. Thu Aug 17 2023 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Interactional negotiation. In: L. Caponetto and P. Labinaz (Eds.), Sbisà on Speech as Action, London: Palgrave Macmillan 2023, 97-119 (Philosophers in Depth). speech acts interactional negotiation conventions In this chapter, I employ Marina Sbisà’s idea of interactional negotiation to consider what it is for conversing agents to follow language conventions or to act “as conforming to a convention”. Specifically, I use the Austinian notions of uptake and response as well as the Lewisian concept of accommodation to discuss a few examples of force negotiation and develop a model of its underlying mechanisms. I also suggest that interactional negotiation plays a key role in the functioning of all language conventions — phatic, rhetic, illocutionary, etc. — construed as families or lineages of linguistic precedents in the sense outlined by Ruth G. Millikan. Thu Jun 22 2023 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Intention and responsibility in demonstrative reference. A view from the theory of speech acts. Studia Semiotyczne, 36(2), 2022, 63-84. demonstrative reference demonstrative gestures directing intentions responsibilism locution illocution perlocution In <i>Critical Pragmatics</i>, Korta and Perry argue that the object a speaker refers to with a demonstrative expression combined with a pointing gesture is determined by her directing intention rather than by her demonstration. They acknowledge that our use of the ordinary concept of ‘what is said’ is affected by our judgements about the speaker’s responsibility for the results of her careless pointing; however, they claim that the effects are perlocutionary and have no bearing on determining the referential content of the speaker’s act. In this paper, I argue that the consequences of careless pointing are illocutionary and play a role in determining demonstrative reference. I also distinguish between two types of referential content which are attributable to the speaker’s utterance and shape its discursive behaviour: what is intended, which is determined by the speaker’s directing intention, and what is public, which depends on what she can legitimately be held responsible for. Wed May 10 2023 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek An Austinian alternative to the Gricean perspective on meaning and communication. Journal of Pragmatics, 201, 2022, 60-75. language conventions grammar linguistic underdeterminacy interactional negotiation metasemantics metapragmatics My aim in this paper is to contribute to the debate on the foundations of semantics and pragmatics by developing an Austinian alternative to the Gricean programme. The Gricean approach has been criticised by Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone who claim that most of the interpretive effects that are usually accounted for as inferentially recognized aspects of meaning are in fact determined by grammar. I argue, however, that it is the Austinian perspective rather than the extended-grammar outlook, that constitutes a genuine alternative to the Gricean programme. Viewed from the Austinian perspective, using language is a social practice that consists of performing conventional speech acts: acts done conforming to a convention. Unlike the Griceans and the proponents of the extended-grammar outlook, however, the Austinians assume that following a convention is not an algorithmic procedure, but a socially controlled process that involves interactional negotiation. They claim, namely, that each language convention — phatic, rhetic, illocutionary, rhetorical, procedural, etc. — is a lineage of reproduced precedents that put some constraints on what can be regarded as saying and doing the same, but underdetermine the exact properties of its new members. Sat Nov 05 2022 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek, Sara Kwiecień, Mateusz Włodarczyk, Małgorzata Wrzosek, Jakub Bondek Prosody in recognizing dialogue-specific functions of speech acts: Evidence from Polish. Language Sciences, 93, 2022, 101499. experimental pragmatics speech acts illocutionary force indicative devices prosodic cues salience linguistic underdeterminacy In this paper, we evaluate the role of prosodic information in inferring dialogue-specific functions of speech acts. We report the results of an empirical study in which participants are exposed to recordings of certain utterances and, next, asked to recognize discursive contexts from which the heard utterances may come. The recorded utterances are quotations: staged utterances produced by speakers asked to read aloud dialogues specially constructed for the study. We analyse prosodic cues produced by recorded speakers and argue that they play a key role in depicting demonstrated target utterance. We assume that participants’ decisions manifest their implicit understanding of dialogue-specific functions of target utterances. The empirical part of our study shows that the efficiency rate of the prosodic cues produced by recorded speakers is 76%. We use the results of our prosodic analysis of recorded utterances to account for some cases of incorrect interpretations reported in the study. Thu Aug 04 2022 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Irony as a speech action. Journal of Pragmatics, 190, 2022, 76-90. verbal irony speech acts felicity conditions linguistic etiolation echo accommodation The paper develops a speech act-based model of verbal irony. It argues, first, that ironic utterances are speech actions performed as conforming to a socially accepted procedure and, second, that they are best understood as so-called etiolated uses of language. The paper is organized into four parts. The first one elaborates on Austin's doctrine of the etiolations of language and distinguishes between the normal or serious mode of communication and its etiolated mode. The second part discusses the dominant approaches to verbal irony and argues that the irony-as-a-trope theories can be viewed as attempts to describe ironic utterances as cases of normal speech, whereas the metalinguistic theories seem to treat them as etiolated uses of language. The third part proposes a set of felicity conditions for ironic acts and puts forth a hypothesis that echo and overt pretence are complementary techniques of linguistic etiolation used for ironizing. The fourth part uses the proposed model to discuss the social dimension of ironizing and argues that utterances intended as acts of ironizing may trigger the accommodating process of context-repair. The take-home message is that ironic utterances are essentially social actions: acts performed by invoking a socially accepted procedure. Tue Feb 01 2022 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Illocution and accommodation in the functioning of presumptions. Synthese, 198, 2021, 6207-6244. presumptions burden of proof speech acts score-keeping accommodation illocution In this paper, I develop a speech-act based account of presumptions. Using a score-keeping model of illocutionary games, I argue that presumptions construed as speech acts can be grouped into three illocutionary act types defined by reference to how they affect the state of a conversation. The paper is organized into two parts. In the first one, I present the score-keeping model of speech act dynamics; in particular, I distinguish between two types of mechanisms—the direct mechanism of illocution and the indirect one of accommodation—that underlie the functioning of illocutionary acts. In the second part, I use the presented model to distinguish between (1) the unilateral act of individual presumption, the point of which is to shift the burden of proof by making the hearer committed to justifying his refusal to endorse the proposition communicated by the speaker, whenever he refuses to endorse it, (2) the bilateral act of joint presumption—‘bilateral’ in that it is performed jointly by at least two conversing agents—the function of which is to confer on the proposition endorsed by the speaker the normative status of jointly recognized though tentative acceptability, and (3) the indirect or back-door act of collective presumption, the purpose of which is to sustain rules and practices to which the conversing agents defer the felicity of their conversational moves. Tue Nov 09 2021 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Preface to a theme issue The Origins of Meaning and the Nature of Speech Acts. Organon F, 28(2), 2021, 270-281. self-expression signalling speech acts organic meaning common ground non-Gricean communication This editorial introduces a thematic issue devoted to Mitchell S. Green’s work on self-expression, signalling, and speech acts. It outlines Green’s signalling model of communication, his account of expressive speech acts, organic meaning, and the common-ground framework, and situates these ideas within debates on pragmatics, communication, and social interaction. The contributions by Stina Bäckström, Marina Bakalova, Maciej Witek, Mateusz Włodarczyk, Felix Bräuer, and Marcin Lewiński critically examine and extend Green’s proposals, addressing expression, music, discourse-constituted thought, communicative evolution, epistemic injustice, and practical argumentation. Together, the papers assess the explanatory power and limitations of non-Gricean, expression-centered approaches to meaning and communication. Wed Mar 17 2021 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Self-Expression in Speech Act. Organon F, 28(2), 2021, 326-359. expressive norms illocutionary communication self-expression speaker meaning speech acts My aim in this paper is to examine Mitchell S. Green’s notion of self-expression and the role it plays in his model of illocutionary communication. The paper is organized into three parts. In Section 2, after discussing Green’s notions of illocutionary speaker meaning and self-expression, I consider the contribution that self-expression makes to the mechanisms of intentional communication; in particular, I introduce the notion of proto-illocutionary speaker meaning and argue that it is necessary to account for acts overtly showing general commitments that are not ‘marked’ as being specific to one or another illocutionary force. In Section 3, I focus on Green’s account of expressive norms and argue that their function is to stabilize rather than constitute the structure of illocutionary signaling systems; moreover, I examine critically Green’s idea according to which expressive norms enable us to indicate the force of our speech acts and suggest that they play a key role in the mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Finally, in Section 4, I elaborate on the idea of discourse-constituted thoughts—or, in other words, thoughts that ex- ist in virtue of being expressed in making certain conversation-bound speech acts—and use it to develop a more comprehensive model of the expressive dimension of speech acts. Wed Mar 17 2021 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Janina Mękarska, Maciej Witek Echo and pretence in commuicative irony. Studia Semiotyczne – English Supplement, 31, 2020, 149-177. irony echo pretence speech acts language etiolation expressive communication In this article, we present a model of communicative irony formulated within the framework of speech act theory. We claim that acts of verbal irony are special cases of phenomena that John L. Austin referred to as “etiolations of language”. After discussing the concept of communicative irony understood in the spirit of Mitchell S. Green’s expressive communication model, we propose to develop the Austinian idea of etiolation and show how cases of etiolative use of language parasitize the mechanisms of its serious or ordinary applications. In particular, we argue that echoing and overt pretence are two etiolation techniques that allow the sender to express a negative attitude towards contextually available mental or linguistic representations. We also show that the proposed model allows the explanation of verbal forms of communicative irony. Wed Jan 22 2020 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek The Expressive Dimension and Score-changing Function of Speech Acts from the Evolutionist Point of View. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 96(3), 2019, 381-398. expression score-keeping speech acts acts of communication veracity credibility The aim of this paper is twofold. First, the author examines Mitchell Green’s (2009) account of the expressive power and score-changing function of speech acts; second, he develops an alternative, though also evolutionist approach to explaining these two hallmarks of verbal interaction. After discussing the central tenets of Green’s model, the author draws two distinctions – between externalist and internalist aspects of veracity, and between perlocutionary and illocutionary credibility – and argues that they constitute a natural refinement of Green’s original conceptual framework. Finally, the author uses the refined framework to develop an alternative account of expressing thoughts with words. In particular, he argues that in theorising about expressing thoughts with words – as well as about using language to change context – we should adopt a Millikanian view on what can be called, following Green, 'acts of communication and an Austinian approach to speech or illocutionary acts'. Thu Sep 12 2019 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Contextual Facilitation of Colour Recognition: Penetrating Beliefs or Colour-Shape Associations? Ruch Filozoficzny, 75(2), 2019, 199-208. early vision modularity colour recognition informational encapsulation Delka-Fillenbaum effect The article presents a defense of the thesis that early vision processes are informationally isolated. Early vision is understood as a perceptual process whose inputs consist of sensory information and whose outputs are so-called primal sketches or shallow visual representations—informational states that represent visual objects with respect to their shape, location, size, color, and brightness. Some researchers challenge the thesis of the informational isolation of early vision by appealing to data suggesting that color recognition processes are supported by beliefs concerning the typical colors of objects of a given kind. The article advances arguments for the claim that these data can be explained by invoking the notion of associations between representations of shapes and colors. Sat Jun 22 2019 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Accommodation in Linguistic Interaction. On the so-called trigggering problem. In: P. Stalmaszczyk (Ed.), Philosophical Insights into Pragmatics, Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter 2019, 163-192 (Philosophical Analysis, 79). accommodation speech acts presuppositions common ground conversational score Accommodation is a process whereby the context of an utterance is adjusted or repaired in order to maintain the default assumption that the utterance constitutes an appropriate conversational move of a certain type. It involves a kind of redressive action on the part of the audience and, depending on what the appropriateness of a speech act requires, results in providing missing contextual elements such as referents for anaphoric expressions, presuppositions, suppositions, deontic facts, pragmatically enriched contents, and so on. It remains to be determined, however, what is the source of the contextual requirements whose recognition motivates and guides the accommodating context-change. The aim of this paper is to address this question – which expresses the so-called triggering or constitution problem – and suggest that it can be adequately answered by a speech act-based model, whose central idea is that the requirements in question are structural components of patterns, scripts or procedures for the performance of speech acts. The paper consists of four parts. Section 1 introduces the notion of accommodation and discusses three examples of accommodating phenomena. Section 2 develops a more elaborated description of the examples discussed in the previous section and proposes a list of questions that an adequate model of accommodation is expected to answer. Section 3 offers a critical examination of three alternative models of accommodation, i.e., David Lewis’s score-keeping model, Robert Stalnaker’s sequential update model, and Richmond Thomason’s enlightened update model; in particular, it considers how they account for the constitution of contextual requirements that trigger and guide mechanisms of context-redressive changes. Finally, Section 4, suggests basic elements of a speech actbased model; it also argues that the proposed framework can be used to explain a wide range of accommodating phenomena and can shed a new sort of light on the constitution of accommodation-triggering requirements. Mon Jan 21 2019 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Coordination and Norms in Illocutionary Interaction. In: M. Witek and I. Witczak-Plisiecka (Eds.), Normativity and Variety of Speech Actions, Leiden: Brill 2019, 66-98 (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 112). speech acts conventions coordination sincerity norms My aim in this paper is to develop a model of the coordinative function of language conventions and, next, use it to account for the normative aspect of illocutionary practice. After discussing the current state of the philosophical debate on the nature of speech acts, I present an interactional account of illocutionary practice (Witek 2015a), which results from integrating Ruth G. Millikan’s (1998; 2005) biological model of language conventions within the framework of Austin’s (1975) theory of speech acts. Next, I elaborate on Millikan’s idea that the proper function of illocutionary conventions is coordinative and put forth a hypothesis according to which conventional patterns of linguistic interaction have been selected for the roles they play in producing and maintaining mental coordination between interacting agents. Finally, I use the resulting model of coordination to develop a naturalistic account of the so-called sincerity norms. Focusing my analysis on assertions and directives, I argue that the normative character of sincerity rules can be accounted for in terms of Normal conditions for proper functioning of speech acts understood as cooperative intentional signs in Millikan’s (2004) sense; I also discuss the possibility of providing a naturalistic account of the normative effects of illocutionary acts. Wed Nov 21 2018 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Iwona Witczak-Plisiecka, Maciej Witek Editorial to the Special Issue of Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities: Normativity and Variety of Speech Actions. In: M. Witek and I. Witczak-Plisiecka (Eds.), Normativity and Variety of Speech Actions, Leiden: Brill 2019, 1-20 (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 112). speech actions normativity illocutionary practice discourse and interaction pragmatics performativity This editorial introduces the special issue Normativity and Variety of Speech Actions, which explores contemporary developments in speech act theory understood broadly as a theory of linguistic action. Building on the Austinian insight that speaking is a form of doing, the volume highlights the normative dimensions of speech actions and the diversity of their manifestations across discourse types and social practices. Contributions by Marina Sbisà, Brian Ball, and Maciej Witek examine different kinds of norms governing illocutionary practice, including constitutive rules, commitments, obligations, and coordination. Papers by Anita Fetzer, Dennis Kurzon, Cristina Corredor, Milada Hirshova, Marcin Matczak, and Mateusz Włodarczyk extend speech act theory to discourse, silence, irony, political communication, legal interpretation, and experimental semantics. Together, the papers demonstrate how speech act theory, when combined with interactional, pragmatic, and interdisciplinary perspectives, provides a powerful framework for analysing meaning, normativity, and social action in language use. Wed Nov 21 2018 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Kasia M. Jaszczolt, Maciej Witek Expressing the Self: From Types of De Se to Speech-Act Types. In: M. Huang and K.M. Jaszczolt (Eds.), Expressing the Self: Cultural Diversity and Cognitive Universals, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018, 187-221. <i>de se</i> thoughts discourse-constituted <i>de se</i> thoughts speech acts self-reference generalized self-reference immunity to error through misindentification In this chapter Kasia M. Jaszczolt and Maciej Witek discuss the cognitive significance of the devices used to communicate de se thoughts and argue (and also partially empirically demonstrate) that, pace some extant proposals and pace the dominant presumption in semantics and philosophy of language, there is no evidence that natural languages use different kinds of expressions for externalizing different aspects of self-reference. On the basis of their empirical results from Polish, as well as evidence from a range of other languages and some theoretical argumentation, they sketch a possible future model founded on a correlation between speech-act types, interlocutors’ goals, and associated linguistic conventions on the one hand and expression type on the other. Thu Feb 01 2018 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Accommodation and Convention. Polish Journal of Philosophy, 10(1), 2016, 99-115. accommodation conventions communicative intentions basic intentions conversational record The paper develops a non-Gricean account of accommodation: a contextadjusting process guided by the assumption that the speaker’s utterance constitutes an appropriate conversational move. The paper is organized into three parts. The first one reconstructs the basic tenets of Lepore and Stone's non-Gricean model of meaningmaking, which results from integrating direct intentionalism and extended semantics. The second part discusses the phenomenon of accommodation as it occurs in conversational practice. The third part uses the tenets of the non-Gricean model of meaning-making to account for the discursive mechanisms underlying accommodation; the proposed account relies on a distinction between the rules of appropriateness, which form part of extended grammar, and the Maxim of Appropriateness, which functions as a discursive norm guiding our conversational practice. Sat Jan 21 2017 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Varieties of Linguistic Conventions. A book symposium on Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone’s Imagination and Convention. Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015). Polish Journal of Philosophy, 10(1), 2016, 7-12. inguistic conventions direct intentionalism Gricean pragmatics conversational implicature legal interpretation indirect speech acts extended grammar This editorial introduces a thematic issue devoted to Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone’s Imagination and Convention, which advances a non-Gricean, convention-based account of linguistic communication. It outlines the contrast between Gricean inferential models and Lepore and Stone’s direct intentionalism, emphasizing extended grammar and disambiguation over pragmatic enrichment. The editorial surveys contributions by Manuel García-Carpintero, Kasia Jaszczolt, Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Marcin Matczak, and Maciej Witek, who critically examine indirect speech acts, conversational implicatures, varieties of convention, legal interpretation, and accommodation. Together, these papers assess the scope, limits, and theoretical consequences of convention-centered approaches to meaning and linguistic practice. Sat Jan 21 2017 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek An interactional account of illocutionary practice. Language Sciences, 47, 2015, 43-55. speech acts language conventions evolution of language linguistic underdeterminacy Austin Millikan The paper aims to develop an interactional account of illocutionary practice, which results from integrating elements of Millikan’s biological model of language within the framework of Austin’s theory of speech acts. The proposed account rests on the assumption that the force of an act depends on what counts as its interactional effect or, in other words, on the response that it conventionally invites or attempts to elicit. The discussion is divided into two parts. The first one reconsiders Austin’s and Millikan’s contributions to the study of linguistic practice. The second part presents the main tenets of the interactional account. In particular, it draws a distinction between primary and secondary conventional patterns of interaction and argues that they make up coherent systems representing different language games or activity types; it is also argued that the proposed account is not subject to the massive ambiguity problem. Wed Sep 23 2015 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Mechanisms of illocutionary games. Language & Communication, 42, 2015, 11-22. illocutionary acts institutional facts score-keeping accommodation Austin Lewis The paper develops a score-keeping model of illocutionary games and uses it to account for mechanisms responsible for creating institutional facts construed as rights and commitments of participants in a dialogue. After introducing the idea of Austinian games—understood as abstract entities representing different levels of the functioning of discourse—the paper defines the main categories of the proposed model: interactional negotiation, illocutionary score, appropriateness rules and kinematics rules. Finally, it discusses the phenomenon of accommodation as it occurs in illocutionary games and argues that the proposed model presupposes an externalist account of illocutionary practice. Fri Jan 23 2015 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Linguistic underdeterminacy: A view from speech act theory. Journal of Pragmatics, 76, 2015, 15-29. linguistic underdeterminacy speech acts Austin contextualism meaning eliminativism The aim of this paper is to reformulate the Linguistic Underdeterminacy Thesis by making use of Austin’s theory of speech acts. Viewed from the post-Gricean perspective, linguistic underdeterminacy consists in there being a gap between the encoded meaning of a sentence uttered by a speaker and the proposition that she communicates. According to the Austinian model offered in this paper, linguistic underdeterminacy should be analysed in terms of semantic and force potentials conventionally associated with the lexical and syntactic properties of the pheme uttered by the speaker; in short, it is claimed that the conventionally specified phatic meaning of an utterance underdetermines its content and force. This Austinian version of the Linguistic Underdeterminacy Thesis plays a central role in a contextualist model of verbal communication. The model is eliminativist with respect to rhetic content and illocutionary force: it takes contents and forces to be one-off constructions whose function is to classify individual utterances in terms of their representational and institutional effects, respectively. Tue Jan 20 2015 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Katarzyna Budzynska, Maciej Witek Non-Inferential Aspects of Ad Hominem and Ad Baculum. Argumentation, 28, 2014, 301-315. communicative and cognitive structures ethos trust speech acts pragmatic force of argument The aim of the paper is to explore the interrelation between persuasion tactics and properties of speech acts. We investigate two types of arguments ad: ad hominem and ad baculum. We show that with both of these tactics, the structures that play a key role are not inferential, but rather ethotic, i.e., related to the speaker’s character and trust. We use the concepts of illocutionary force and constitutive conditions related to the character or status of the speaker in order to explain the dynamics of these two techniques. In keeping with the research focus of the Polish School of Argumentation, we examine how the pragmatic and rhetorical aspects of the force of ad hominem and ad baculum arguments exploit trust in the speaker’s status to influence the audience’s cognition. Sat Jul 19 2014 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Three Approaches to the Study of Speech Acts. Dialogue and Universalism, 23(1), 2013, 129-141. Austin illocutionary acts communicative intentions constitutive rules verbal interaction The paper reconstructs and discusses three different approaches to the study of speech acts: (i) the intentionalist approach, according to which most illocutionary acts are to be analysed as utterances made with the Gricean communicative intentions, (ii) the institutionalist approach, which is based on the idea of illocutions as institutional acts constituted by systems of collectively accepted rules, and (iii) the interactionalist approach the main tenet of which is to perform illocutionary acts by making conventional moves in accordance with patterns of social interaction. It is claimed that, first, each of the discussed approaches presupposes a different account of the nature and structure of illocutionary acts, and, second, all those approaches result from one-sided interpretations of Austin’s conception of verbal action. The first part of the paper reconstructs Austin's views on the functions and effects of felicitous illocutionary acts. The second part reconstructs and considers three different research developments in the post-Austinian speech act theory—the intentionalist approach, the institutionalist approach, and the interactionalist approach. Sat Jul 19 2014 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek How to Establish Authority with Words: Imperative Utterances and Presupposition Accommodation. In: A. Brożek, J. Jadacki & B. Žarnic (Eds.), Theory of Imperatives from Different Points of View (2), Warszawa: Semper 2013, 145-157. authority illocutionary acts accommodation Lewis Austin The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it aims at providing an account of an indirect mechanism responsible for establishing one’s power to issue binding directive acts; second, it is intended as a case for an externalist account of illocutionary interaction. The mechanism in question is akin to what David Lewis calls “presupposition accommodation”: a rule-governed process whereby the context of an utterance is adjusted to make the utterance acceptable; the main idea behind the proposed account is that the indirect power-establishing mechanism involves the use of imperative sentences that function as presupposition triggers and as such can trigger off the accommodating change of the context of their utterance. According to the externalist account of illocutionary interaction, in turn, at least in some cases the illocutionary force of an act is determined by the audience’s uptake rather than by what the speaker intends or believes; in particular, at least in some cases it is the speaker, not her audience, who is invited to accommodate the presupposition of her act. The paper has three parts. The first one defines a few terms — i.e., an “illocution”, a “binding act”, the “audience’s uptake” and an “Austinian presupposition” — thereby setting the stage for the subsequent discussion. The second part formulates and discusses the main problem of the present paper: what is the source of the agent’s power to perform binding directive acts? The third part offers an account of the indirect power-establishing mechanism and discusses its externalist implications. Thu Sep 19 2013 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Tacit Mechanisms and Heuristic Theorizing: Comments on Ryszard Wójcicki’s Is There Only One Truth? An Introduction to the Pragmatic Theory of Knowledge Acquisition. Filozofia Nauki, 20(1), 2012, 33-44. knowledge acquisition tacit knowledge informational encapsulation heuristic inference My aim in this paper is to develop a preliminary typology of subconscious, tacit mechanisms that underlie the conscious exercise of practical skills as well as the formation and functioning of conscious mental representations such as perceptual experiences, mental images, explicitly held beliefs and explanatory hypotheses. With this typology in hand, I consider whether these tacit mechanisms — or at least some of their aspects — can be examined and explicated by what Ryszard Wójcicki calls heuristic theorizing or heuristic reasoning. Wed Sep 19 2012 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Naturalizing Illocutionary Rules. In: M. Miłkowski and K. Talmont-Kaminski (Eds.), Beyond Description: Naturalism and Normativity, London: College Publications 2010, 243-264. illocutionary rules proper function Searle Millikan In this paper, I consider the concept of an illocutionary rule – i.e., the rule of the form <i>X counts as Y in context C</i> – and examine the role it plays in explaining the nature of verbal communication and the conventionality of natural languages. My aim is to find a middle ground between John R. Searle's view, according to which every conventional speech act has to be explained in terms of illocutionary rules that underlie its performance, and the view held by Ruth G Millikan, who seems to suggest that the formula <i>X counts as Y in context C</i> has no application in our theorizing about human linguistic practice. I claim, namely, that the concept of an illocutionary rule is theoretically useful, though not explanatorily basic. I argue that using the formula <i>X counts as Y in context C</i> we can classify illocutionary acts by what Millikan calls their conventional outcomes, and thereby make them susceptible to naturalistic explanation. Sun Sep 19 2010 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Scepticism about reflexive intentions refuted. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics, 5(1), 2009, 69-83. speech act theory illocution communicative intentions The aim of this paper is to resist four arguments, originally developed by Mark Siebel, that seem to support scepticism about reflexive communicative intentions. I argue, first, that despite their complexity reflexive intentions are thinkable mental representations. To justify this claim, I offer an account of the cognitive mechanism that is capable of producing an intention whose content refers to the intention itself. Second, I claim that reflexive intentions can be individuated in terms of their contents. Third, I argue that the explanatory power of the theory of illocutionary reflexive intentions is not as limited as it would initially seem. Finally, I reject the suggestion that the conception of reflexive communicative intentions ascribes to a language user more cognitive abilities than he or she really has. Mon Jul 06 2009 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Iwona Witczak-Plisiecka, Maciej Witek The many faces of speech act theory — editorial to special issue on speech actions. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics, 5(1), 2009, 1-8. speech act theory linguistic action illocutionary force pragmatics convention and intention context This editorial introduces the <i>Lodz Papers in Pragmatics</i> special issue <i>The Many Faces of Speech Act Theory</i>, which showcases the diversity of contemporary approaches to speech acts understood as forms of linguistic action embedded in complex communicative contexts. The editors situate the volume against the background of the Austin–Searle tradition while emphasizing the fragmentation of speech act theory into partially incompatible frameworks that nevertheless share a commitment to language as action. The contributions reflect this diversity. Robert M. Harnish examines internalist and externalist classifications of speech act theories; Marina Sbisà defends an Austinian, convention-based account of illocutionary force; Friedrich C. Doerge argues for preserving Austin’s original conception of illocutionary acts; Maciej Witek defends reflexive intention-based accounts of communication; Iwona Witczak-Plisiecka argues for the autonomy of pragmatics; Rita Brdar-Szabó and Mario Brdar analyze indirect directives in recipes cross-linguistically; and Mary Kate McGowan applies speech act theory to debates on pornography and free speech. Together, the papers highlight open questions concerning force, context, convention, and the architecture of linguistic action. Mon Jul 06 2009 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek A Contextualist Account of the Linguistic Reality. In: J. Odrowąż-Sypniewska (Ed.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science at Warsaw University, vol. 4, Warszawa: Semper 2008, 59-80. contextualism conventions linguistic underdeterminacy complete linguistic signs Devitt Millikan This paper presents a contextualist account of linguistic reality, arguing against the strictly psychological interpretations of linguistic properties as proposed by Devitt. It posits that linguistic entities are better understood as complex physical states of affairs termed complete linguistic signs, integrating both linguistic tokens and context. A Millikanian perspective is advocated to explain human communication, reflecting on the Underdeterminacy Thesis as a key structural feature of linguistic interactions, emphasizing contextual factors rather than cognitive processes. Fri Sep 19 2008 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Truth and Conversation. Philosophica, 75(1), 2005, 103-135. The paper examines the equivalence property (EP) regarding the use of the truth predicate in conversational contexts, exploring its theoretical implications through three accounts: Ramsey's redundancy theory, Horwich's minimal conception, and inflationism. It presents a critique of semantic deflationism, arguing that it fails to adequately explain the cognitive processes at play in truth attribution and the relevance of EP in evaluating statements. The work concludes that EP, as a pragmatic phenomenon, requires a more nuanced understanding that integrates both meaning and the context of use. Sun Jan 02 2005 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Introduction. Philosophica, 75, 2005, 5-10. pragmatics speech acts normativity truth knowledge philosophy of language This editorial introduces the <i>Philosophica</i> special issue <i> Truth, Knowledge and the Pragmatics of Natural Language</i>, devoted to the pragmatic turn in the philosophy of language and its implications for semantics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. It situates the volume against the background of Charles Morris’s tripartite division of semiotics and traces the shift toward pragmatics inspired by later Wittgenstein and Peircean semiotics. The issue brings together contributions that address core problems in general pragmatics as well as pragmatically informed approaches to knowledge and truth. Robert M. Harnish defends a Gricean account of illocutionary communication against Austinian alternatives; Jaroslav Peregrin examines normative pragmatics through Brandom’s and Davidson’s views; John Collier and Konrad Talmont-Kamiński develop a functional pragmatics grounded in Peircean semiotics; Adam Grobler offers a presupposition-based account of knowledge and truth; and Maciej Witek argues against deflationism about truth. Together, the papers illustrate the scope and philosophical significance of pragmatics across linguistic and epistemic domains. Sun Jan 02 2005 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Searle, Burge and Intentional Content. In: J. C. Marek & M. E. Reicher (Eds.), Experience and Analysis. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, vol. XII, Kirchberg 2004, 413-415. percptual experience phenomenal content intentional content Searle: Burge This paper explores the internalist perspective on intentional content as advocated by John Searle, contrasting it with externalist viewpoints represented by philosophers like Tyler Burge and Kent Bach. Searle's internalism posits that the content of mental states is determined independently of external environmental factors, asserting that perceptual states and their satisfaction conditions are deeply linked to the agent's internal mental framework. The discussion culminates in an analysis of the implications of Searle's arguments for the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge, challenging whether internalism can coherently align with the notion of intuitive access to one's own mental states. Mon Aug 02 2004 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Wittgenstein and the Internalism-Externalism Dilemma. In: W. Löffler & P. Weingartner (Eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, vol. XI, Kirchberg 2003, 374-376. internalism externalism Private Language Argument intentional content first-person point of view referential uses of language It can be said that Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument initiated the internalism-externalism dilemma. In one of its interpretations the argument is read as a criticism of methodological solipsism. Internalism, in turn, assumes that methodological solipsism is an adequate account of mental content. Therefore some externalists refer to Wittgenstein as their forerunner. I argue, first, that the Private Language Argument does not support the claim of externalism that meanings are not in the head, even though it undermines methodological solipsism. I also claim that both internalism and externalism are not free from serious problems. Therefore we need a view that goes beyond the distinction in hand. To arrive at such a view I examine John Searle's account of mental content and argue that the real tension within the theory of content is between the first-person and the third-person point of view. Sat Aug 02 2003 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek The Minimalist Conception of Truth and Philosophy of Science: Ajdukiewicz’s Account of Scientific Inquiry. In: A. Rojszczak, J. Cachro, and G. Kurczewski (Eds.), Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003, 251-266. In this paper, I consider Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning as a form of deflationism. This theory was formulated in the thirties and was published in two articles: <i>Sprache und Sinn</i> and <i>Das Veltbild und die Begriffsapparatur</i>. My paper is intended as not only a historical study. Above all I want to interpret some aspects of Ajdukiewicz's construction as a theoretical model of deflationary ideas concerning science. I believe that this will help in examining the capacity of the deflationary account to accommodate some important facts regarding rationality and scientific development. The paper consists of five parts. In the first, I introduce some terminological conventions regarding the use of the terms <i>semantics</i> and <i>theory of language</i>. In the second, I present the deflationary view as a conjunction of a few theses. In the next, I relate Ajdukiewicz's theory, identifying deflationary aspects of it. In the fourth part I examine a possible alternative interpretation of the theory in question as a form of antirealism. I believe this might explain why deflationism is sometimes regarded as a sophisticated kind of antirealism. In the last, critical part, I indicate some limits of the deflationary account of scientific development. Thu Jan 02 2003 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
In Polish
- Janina Mękarska, Maciej Witek Echo i udawanie w ironii komunikacyjnej (Echo and Pretending in Communicative Irony). Studia Semiotyczne, 23(2), 2019, 364-394. irony echo pretence speech acts linguistic etiolation expressive communication In this paper, we present a model of communicative irony formulated within speech act theory. We argue that acts of verbal irony constitute special cases of phenomena that John L. Austin referred to as <i>etiolations of language</i>. After discussing the notion of communicative irony understood in the spirit of Mitchell S. Green’s model of expressive communication, we propose a development of Austin’s idea of etiolations and show how etiological uses of language parasitize the mechanisms of its serious or ordinary uses. In particular, we argue that echoic mention and overt pretence are two etiolation techniques that enable speakers to express a negative attitude toward contextually available mental or linguistic representations. We also show that the proposed model allows for an explanation of verbal forms of communicative irony. Sun Dec 01 2019 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Myślenie wolne, myślenie szybkie i implikatury konwersacyjne. O zaletach podejścia interdyscyplinarnego (Slow Thinking, Fast Thinking, and Conversational Implicatures: On the Advantages of an Interdisciplinary Approach). In: A. Wawrzyniak, B. Wąsikowska, M. Witek (red.), Interdyscyplinarność w naukach ekonomicznych. Zastosowanie modeli, metod oraz technik neuronauki poznawczej i kognitywistyki, Warszawa: CeDeWu 2017, 105-122. dual-process theory conversational implicature scalar implicature heuristics interdisciplinarity cognitive science This chapter explores the relationship between psychological dual-process theories of cognition and pragmatic theories of meaning, focusing on conversational implicatures. Drawing on the distinction between fast, automatic cognitive processes and slow, controlled ones developed by Tversky and Kahneman, the author examines how implicatures are generated and interpreted in everyday communication. The paper contrasts rationalist accounts, which model implicature derivation as controlled inferential reasoning, with coherence-based approaches that emphasize automatic heuristics and discourse-level expectations. Particular attention is paid to scalar implicatures, which are argued to arise, at least in many cases, from fast and automatic processes rather than deliberate reasoning. In the final part, the paper offers an alternative interpretation of the famous <i>Linda problem</i>, suggesting that unnoticed scalar implicatures may influence participants’ probability judgments. The analysis illustrates how integrating insights from psychology and pragmatics can enrich both disciplines and lead to novel explanatory hypotheses. Sun Dec 31 2017 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Jak polemizować z relatywizmem kulturowym. O dwóch strategiach antyrelatywistycznych (How to Argue against Cultural Relativism: On Two Anti-Relativist Strategies). In: A. Brożek, A. Chybińska, M. Gryganiec, M. Tkaczyk (red.), Myśli o języku, nauce i wartościach. Seria druga, Warszawa: Semper 2016, 495-505. cultural relativism rationality pragmatism incommensurability The chapter examines how cultural relativism should be criticized by reconstructing its core commitments and comparing two anti-relativist strategies. Cultural relativism is analysed as the conjunction of a thesis about the cultural conditioning of thought and a thesis about the incommensurability of cultures. Against this background, the chapter contrasts a Cartesian strategy, which rejects cultural conditioning through methodological doubt, with a pragmatic strategy, which accepts such conditioning but denies that it entails incommensurability. Drawing on pragmatism and the network model of rationality, the author argues that the pragmatic strategy is theoretically stronger and better suited to explaining rational change within and between cultures, while avoiding both relativism and ethnocentrism. Fri Nov 25 2016 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Zła mowa (Bad Speech). Przegląd Uniwersytecki, 4-6, 2016, 4-8. harmful speech speech acts accommodation normativity The article analyses forms of harmful speech that operate indirectly and often go unnoticed, yet produce real normative consequences. Drawing on speech act theory and the concept of accommodation, it argues that bad speech primarily consists in unjustly restricting the rights of individuals or social groups, for instance through veiled accusations or subordinating utterances. Such speech acts work by exploiting shared communicative practices and the passivity of audiences, who thereby help to accommodate harmful presuppositions or authority relations. The article contrasts narrow and broad models of public discourse and shows how resisting bad speech requires active blocking of accommodation mechanisms rather than mere appeals to freedom of expression. Fri Jul 01 2016 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Akty mowy (Speech Acts). In: J. Odrowąż-Sypniewska (red.), Przewodnik po filozofii języka, Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM 2016, 367-412. speech acts illocutionary acts perlocutionary acts performatives convention pragmatics This chapter introduces speech act theory as a philosophical approach that treats language primarily as a form of social action rather than mere description. It explains the distinction between illocutionary acts, which conventionally modify the normative positions of speakers and hearers, and perlocutionary acts, which concern the psychological and practical effects of utterances. After situating the study of speech acts at the intersection of philosophy of language and linguistic pragmatics, the chapter reconstructs J. L. Austin’s critique of the “descriptive fallacy” and his account of performatives, conditions of felicity, and the tripartite structure of speech acts. It then surveys major philosophical controversies concerning the nature of illocutionary acts, focusing on competing views that understand them as communicative, institutional, or interactional phenomena. The chapter concludes by assessing the theoretical role and explanatory value of illocutionary acts in philosophical and pragmatic analyses of language use. Wed Jun 01 2016 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Jak zdobywać punkty w grze illokucyjnej (How to Score Points in the Illocutionary Game). In: P. Stalmaszczyk (red.), Od zdań do aktów mowy. Rozważania lingwistyczne i filozoficzne, Lódź: Primum Verbum 2015, 188-206 (Studia z metodologii i filozofii językoznawstwa, t. 3). illocutionary game speech acts normative facts scorekeeping commitments and entitlements discourse structure The chapter develops a model of linguistic interaction conceived as an illocutionary game, extending Austin’s distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary aspects of speech from individual speech acts to structured forms of goal-directed social activity. An illocutionary game is understood as an interaction between at least two participants whose verbal and non-verbal moves are evaluated against a dynamically evolving score. Each move is formally represented as a function mapping one score state to another, where score states encode those contextual features that are relevant for interpreting and assessing subsequent moves. Central to the model is the idea that illocutionary moves generate normative facts, such as rights, commitments, and obligations, which constitute the core of what it means to “score points” in such a game. The chapter concludes with a methodological remark on the explanatory role of score-based models in the study of linguistic activity and illustrates the framework with two case studies: rule-establishing discourse and argumentative dialogue. Thu Oct 01 2015 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Neoaustionowskie ujęcie interakcji illokucyjnej (A Neo-Austinian Account of Illocutionary Interaction). In: P. Stalmaszczyk, P. Cap (red.), Pragmatyka, retoryka, argumentacja. Obrazy języka i dyskursu w naukach humaniatycznych, Kraków: Universitas 2014, 139-159. speech acts illocutionary force linguistic interaction neo-Austinian theory normativity entitlements and commitments In this chapter, I present a neo-Austinian account of speech acts and defend the claim that the category of illocutionary force is useful in research on linguistic interaction. The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first, I review critical opinions concerning research approaches inspired by the concept of illocutionary force. I also formulate two theses about speech act theory—a strong one and a weak one—and argue that the opinions discussed concern, at most, the former. The strong thesis holds that the theory of illocutionary acts provides the foundations for all research on linguistic interaction; by contrast, according to the weak thesis, the category of illocutionary force enables an accurate account of conversational mechanisms responsible for the creation of normative states of affairs. In the second part, I present the core ideas of an approach to speech acts that I call <i>interactionist</i> and explain why it deserves to be described as neo-Austinian. In the third part, I offer, among other things, an outline of a neo-Austinian explanation of the mechanisms responsible for modifying the normative sphere of the entitlements and commitments of interaction participants, thereby contributing to the justification of the weak thesis about speech act theory. Wed Oct 01 2014 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Spór między internalizmem i eksternalizmem w teorii czynności mowy (The Dispute between Internalism and Externalism in Speech Act Theory). In: P. Stalmaszczyk (red.), Metodologie językoznawstwa. Ewolucja języka, ewolucja teorii językoznawczych, Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego 2013, 161-177 (Łódzkie Studia z Językoznawstwa Angielskiego i Ogólnego, 1). speech act theory internalism and externalism illocutionary force pragmatic externalism illocutionary agency In this chapter, I present the dispute between internalist and externalist accounts of illocutionary interaction and then argue that the externalist approach makes it possible to explain several discursive phenomena that cannot be accounted for within an internalist framework. The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, I compare semantic externalism, understood as a position concerning the content of a speech act, with pragmatic externalism, understood as a position concerning the illocutionary force of an act. In the second part, I distinguish two varieties of pragmatic externalism discussed in the literature—externalism about felicity conditions and externalism about illocutionary agency—and show that the latter is a specific variant of the former. In the third part, I consider arguments in favor of accepting externalism about illocutionary agency. In particular, I observe that this position allows us to explain discursive phenomena that, from an internalist perspective, are either unrecognizable or dismissed as insignificant anomalies: namely, unintended yet binding illocutions, the spontaneous emergence of ritualized forms of discourse, and the indirect shaping of the normative structure of society. Sun Dec 01 2013 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Rozum planujący, rozum improwizujący i prowincjonalizm (Planning Reason, Improvising Reason, and Provincialism). Przegląd Uniwersytecki, 10-12, 2012, 24-25. rationality improvisation planning provincialism The article distinguishes two forms of rational activity: planning reason and improvising reason. Planning reason operates through prior reflection and systematic execution, while improvising reason integrates reflection and action in real time, responding flexibly to local constraints, available resources, and evolving goals. Using examples ranging from urban development to everyday conversation, the article argues that improvising reason, though easily mistaken for chaos, plays a dominant role in human practice. Failures to recognize its contextual rationality often lead to misguided accusations of irrationality. Such accusations are diagnosed as expressions of provincialism: the tendency to universalize one’s own local perspective and overlook the rational agency of others acting under different conditions. Thu Dec 20 2012 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Jakie skojarzenia ma umysł obliczeniowy? W obronie tezy o informacyjnej izolacji systemu wczesnego widzenia (What Associations Does the Computational Mind Have? In Defence of the Thesis of Informational Encapsulation of the Early Visual System). Studia z Kognitywistyki i Filozofii Umysłu, 6(2), 2012, 67-82. modularity of mind constructivism informational encapsulation early vision colour perception Delk and Fillenbaum effect In this paper, I defend the thesis of the informational encapsulation of the early vision system against objections that appeal to experiments allegedly showing that beliefs about the typical colours of objects influence the construction of shallow visual representations. By shallow visual representations I mean perceptual experiences that represent external stimuli solely in terms of such properties as shape, size, location, and colour. I argue that the experimental findings cited by opponents of informational encapsulation can be explained by a hypothesis according to which the early vision system constructs shallow visual representations by drawing on a local store of information about the typical colours of certain shapes, where this store takes the form of a network of associative links modified by experience. I also describe experiments by means of which this hypothesis could be tested. Sat Dec 01 2012 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Reporter w wielokulturowym świecie: między relatywizmem, prowincjonalizmem i krytycyzmem (The Reporter in a Multicultural World: Between Relativism, Provincialism, and Criticism). In: A. Głąb, Filozofia i literatura, Warszawa: Semper 2011, 317-327. cultural relativism multiculturalism reportage criticism objectivity Kapuściński The chapter examines the intellectual challenge posed by cultural relativism in a multicultural world, using the figure of the reporter—exemplified by the literary work of Ryszard Kapuściński—as a philosophical lens. It reconstructs cognitive and ethical relativism as reactions to cultural diversity and argues that their appeal rests on two illusions: the view of cultures as closed and static systems, and the belief that provincialism is the only alternative to relativism. Against both relativism and provincialism, the chapter defends a critical stance according to which the idea of objective correctness retains a regulative function without being identified with the standards of any particular culture. Drawing on Kapuściński’s reportage and on Herodotus as an early model of intercultural inquiry, the author shows that encounters with other cultures enable self-knowledge, learning, and internal critique. Multicultural dialogue is thus presented not as a confrontation of incommensurable perspectives, but as an interaction between open traditions capable of mutual transformation. Sat Oct 01 2011 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Koncepcja pojęć ad hoc jako wytworów interpretacji aktów komunikacyjnych. Analiza krytyczna (The Conception of Ad Hoc Concepts as Products of the Interpretation of Communicative Acts: A Critical Analysis). In: J. Bremer, A. Chuderski (red.), Pojęcia. Jak reprezentujemy i kategoryzujemy świat, Kraków: Universitas 2011, 139-172. ad hoc concepts linguistic underdeterminacy truth-conditional pragmatics relevance theory concept modulation meaning eliminativism This chapter examines the post-Gricean conception of <i>ad hoc</i> concepts as products of the interpretation of communicative acts. The discussion is situated within truth-conditional pragmatics and is motivated by the thesis of linguistic underdeterminacy, according to which knowledge of conventional meaning is insufficient to determine the truth conditions of utterances. I reconstruct the theory of <i>ad hoc</i> concepts as developed primarily within relevance theory, focusing on the idea that pragmatic interpretation involves the context-driven modulation of lexically encoded concepts rather than the mere addition of unarticulated constituents. I then critically assess this approach, paying particular attention to its explanatory scope, its treatment of literal and non-literal meaning, and its reliance on a notion of concept modulation. I argue that taking the theory seriously leads to substantial revisions of standard semantic assumptions and motivates stronger positions, including meaning eliminativism and conceptual nominalism. On these views, words do not encode stable conceptual meanings, and all concepts involved in utterance interpretation are, in an important sense, <i>ad hoc</i>. Wed Jun 01 2011 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Spór o podstawy teorii czynności mowy (The Dispute over the Foundations of Speech Act Theory). Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego 2011, s. 466. speech act theory linguistic action convention and intention semantics–pragmatics interface literalism contextualism communicative competence complete linguistic signs This monograph addresses the foundational dispute within contemporary speech act theory concerning the nature of linguistic action and the relation between semantics and pragmatics. Although speech act theory is often presented as a relatively recent and unified research programme originating with Austin, the book situates it against a broader historical and theoretical background and argues that its contemporary form is shaped by two intersecting controversies. The first concerns the ontological status of speech acts and opposes convention-based (Austinian) accounts to intention-based (Gricean) approaches. The second concerns the epistemological and cognitive relation between semantic competence and pragmatic competence, crystallized in the debate between literalism and contextualism. The book critically reconstructs both disputes, focusing not on the history of particular authors but on the underlying problem situations that structure current theoretical options. It shows that neither a purely conventionalist nor a purely intention-based account can adequately explain the full range of linguistic actions, and that neither strict literalism nor radical contextualism offers a satisfactory account of meaning determination. In response, the monograph develops an alternative framework grounded in Ruth Millikan’s biological model of language and a theory of complete linguistic signs. This framework allows for a non-reductive reconciliation of convention and intention, as well as a principled division of explanatory labour between semantic and pragmatic factors, thereby offering a unified account of speech acts and linguistic understanding. Sun Jan 30 2011 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Między inferencjonizmem i antyinferencjonizmem: spór o naturę kompetencji komunikacyjnej po odkryciu zjawiska niedookreślenia językowego (Between Inferentialism and Anti-Inferentialism: The Dispute over the Nature of Communicative Competence after the Discovery of Linguistic Underdetermination). In: P. Stalmaszczyk, Metodologie językoznawstwa: Filozoficzne i empiryczne problemy w analizie języka, Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego 2010, 63-90. communicative competence linguistic underdetermination inferentialism anti-inferentialism pragmatics speech act theory The chapter examines the debate between inferentialism and anti-inferentialism concerning the nature of communicative competence in light of the discovery of linguistic underdetermination. Starting from the post-Gricean paradigm, it argues that the semantic meaning of linguistic expressions is generally insufficient to determine what is said, and that primary interpretive processes must therefore involve pragmatic factors. The chapter distinguishes between primary and secondary processes of interpretation and asks whether both are inferential in nature. After outlining the phenomenon of linguistic underdetermination and its various forms, the author presents two inferentialist approaches—the theory of relevance and the expanded speech act schema—as well as two anti-inferentialist positions. The analysis shows that inferentialism offers a unified account of meaning determination but risks overgeneralizing inferential mechanisms, whereas anti-inferentialism provides a more differentiated picture of communicative competence by recognizing non-inferential pragmatic abilities. The chapter thus clarifies the theoretical stakes of the debate and its implications for contemporary pragmatics. Fri Oct 01 2010 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Czynności illokucyjne jako akty interakcyjne (Illocutionary Acts as Interactional Actions). Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria, 19(3), 2010, 359-390. illocutionary acts linguistic interaction social interaction Austin Searle In this paper, I challenge the traditional assumption that illocutionary acts of the same type are homogeneous with respect to the factors that determine their illocutionary force. I identify a fundamental dispute between Austinian and Gricean traditions: Austinians treat basic illocutionary acts as essentially conventional, while Griceans view them as fundamentally communicative, driven by speaker intentions. I propose an alternative framework grounded in the idea of <i>heterogeneity</i>: illocutionary force varies across instances of the same type because it depends on different kinds of interactional effects. Central to this approach is the concept of <i>interactional effect</i>—the specific change in the listener’s behavior, thoughts, or actions that an utterance brings about within a social interaction. I argue that this interactional effect, whether rooted in conventional patterns or in the speaker’s intentions, better explains the illocutionary force of speech acts. I situate this framework within broader debates on speech-act theory and outlines its methodological implications. Wed Sep 01 2010 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Niedookreślenie językowe z punktu widzenia teorii zwrotnych warunków prawdziwości (Linguistic Underdetermination from the Perspective of the Reflexive Truth-Conditional Theory). Filozofia Nauki, 17(3), 2009, 57-97. linguistic underdeterminacy Grice literalism contextualism semantics/pragmatics interface token-reflexivity The aim of the paper is to present the theory of reflexive truth conditions with particular reference to the literalist account of communicative competence it offers. Like contextualist conceptions, the theory allows for the phenomenon of linguistic underdeterminacy. Unlike most popular accounts of communicative competence, however, it takes the phenomenon to be a property of the semantic, rather than the cognitive correlate of an utterance; it is claimed, namely, that the semantic correlate of an utterance is to be identified with the state of affairs the utterance signifies, whereas its cognitive correlate is best understood as the conventionally determined, token-reflexive description of the signified state. The paper consists of four parts. In the first section the author offers a few terminological conventions. The second section provides a synthetic presentation of the dominant view on the nature and causes of linguistic underdeterminacy. In the third section, following Manuel García-Carpintero, John Perry and Kepa Korta, the author develops his own version of the reflexive truth conditions theory and points out that the resulting conception offers an original account of linguistic underdeterminacy. The paper ends with general conclusions regarding the nature of linguistic underdetermination and the structure of the literalism/contextualism debate. Tue Sep 01 2009 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Teoria teorii znaczenia (A Theory of Theories of Meaning). Filozofia Nauki, 17(2), 2009, 99-112. semantics methodology of semantics metaphysics of meaning epistemology of meaning The aim of the paper is to evaluate critically Wacław Janikowski's radically empiricist theory of meaning. In the first section, the author offers a critical analysis of the main theses and definitions proposed by Janikowski. His conclusion is that Janikowski fails to provide a coherent theory of meaning, balancing between functionalism, mentalism and behaviorism. In the second section, the author offers a more general reflection on the actual aim and expected form of a theory of meaning. He claims that in order to construct a comprehensive and adequate account of meaning one should start with the ontological question on the nature of linguistic items, and then ask the epistemological question on the structure of linguistic or communicative competence and end with considerations on the methodology of linguistic studies. In other words, the author rejects the approach tacitly adopted by Janikowski, who starts his theoretical reflection by deriving ontological conclusions on the nature of meaning from the previously accepted methodological principles. Mon Jun 01 2009 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek O dwóch dylematach dotyczących roli semantyki w badaniach nad językiem (On Two Dilemmas Concerning the Role of Semantics in the Study of Language). In: E. Kochan i P. Ziemski (red.), Oblicza kultury. Człowiek — poznanie — twórczość. Profesor Halinie Perkowskiej w darze, Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego 2008, 185-210. semantics–pragmatics distinction semantic underdetermination contextualism literalism semantic realism universalist semiotics The chapter analyzes two philosophical dilemmas concerning the role of semantics in the study of language, arising from postmodern critiques and from contemporary debates on the semantics–pragmatics distinction. The first dilemma concerns the autonomy of semantics and is reconstructed through the dispute between literalism and contextualism, especially in light of the phenomenon of semantic underdetermination. The second dilemma concerns the realist character of semantics and the challenge posed by universalist semiotics, often associated with the postmodern thesis that everything is text. The author argues that these two dilemmas are independent: rejecting the autonomy of semantics does not entail rejecting semantic realism. Drawing on relevance theory and Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic account of natural signs, the chapter proposes a contextualist yet realist conception of meaning. On this view, linguistic expressions acquire truth-conditional content only within language games, but their interpretation relies on the same cognitive capacities that underlie our interaction with a mind-independent reality. Wed Oct 01 2008 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Spór o naturę prawdy z punktu widzenia teorii czynności mowy (The Dispute over the Nature of Truth from the Perspective of Speech Act Theory). Filozofia Nauki, 14(2), 2006, 131-146. metasemantics theory of meaning semantic underdeterminancy literalism contextualism pragmatics/semantics interface There are at least three distinct arguments about the nature of truth. The first two are, respectively, between correspondence theories and epistemic theories and between inflationism and deflationism. The aim of the paper is to characterise the third dispute whose starting question is whether truth and truth conditions are semantic or pragmatic concepts. In other words, the question is whether it is semantics or pragmatics that provides an adequate account of truth conditions of utterances. There are two competing answers: the conception of literal truth conditions, which takes its origins in H.P. Grice's theory of language, and the conception of context-sensitive truth conditions, which appeals to the phenomena called semantic underdeterminancy. The author claims that the argument between these two conceptions in question cannot be identified with the dispute between literalism and contextualism. Whereas the former focus on the specific problem of truth conditions of utterances, the latter deals with a more general issue called Semantics/Pragmatics Interface. According to the author, these two dilemmas seem to cut across each other. More precisely, the idea of context-sensitive truth conditions can be interpreted either along the literalist's or contextualist's lines. According to the author it contextualism, not literalism, that provides a better, pragmatic account of truth conditions. Thu Jun 01 2006 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Prawda, język i poznanie z perspektywy deflacjonizmu. Analiza krytyczna (Truth, Language and Cognition from the Deflationary Point of View. A Critical Examination). Kraków: Aureus 2005, s. 380. deflationism disquotation schema philosophy of language epistemic normativity scientific rationality metasemantic This monograph offers a systematic and critical examination of deflationary conceptions of truth and their implications for philosophy of language and epistemology. Deflationism denies that truth is a substantive property shared by all true statements and maintains that the role of the truth predicate is exhausted by instances of the disquotation schema. While deflationary views have been influential in analytic philosophy from Frege and Ramsey to contemporary minimalism, this book argues that deflationism ultimately fails as a comprehensive account of truth. The central claim is twofold. First, deflationary theories do not adequately explain important conversational, cognitive, and epistemic functions of the concept of truth, including its attributive uses and its role in linguistic interpretation. Second, by denying truth any genuine explanatory power, deflationism undermines our ability to account for scientific rationality, epistemic normativity, and the idea of cognitive progress. Focusing primarily on the disquotational theory of truth as the most plausible version of deflationism, the book critically evaluates its semantic, epistemological, and methodological commitments. Against deflationary naturalism and semantic reductionism, it defends the view that the substantive notion of truth plays an indispensable explanatory role in theories of communication and rational inquiry. The concluding chapter outlines a non-reductionist research programme that integrates truth into an account of cognition and linguistic practice without reifying it as a metaphysical property. Wed Nov 30 2005 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Zgodność z rzeczywistością. Uwagi o Jacka J. Jadackiego teorii prawdy (Correspondence with Reality: Remarks on Jacek J. Jadacki’s Theory of Truth). Filozofia Nauki, 13(3), 2005, 115-126. theory of truth correspondence relation holding realist versus epistemic theories of truth The author starts with the assumption that a popular idea, according to which a true sentence corresponds with reality, is adequate. Therefore, any adequate theory of truth has to account for it. It turns out, however, that it is the epistemic conception, not the correspondence one, that meets such a demand. In order to justify his claim, the author discusses Jacek J. Jadacki's theory of truth. Roughly speaking, the theory in question states that if a given sentence refers to a certain state of affairs - that function a the sentence's semantic value - then the sentence is true if and only if the relevant state of affairs holds. In short, the theory defines the truth of a given sentence in terms of the holding of the state of affairs to which the sentence refers. It remains to be explained, therefore, what it is, for a given state of affairs to hold. The author considers three possible accounts of the holding of the state of affairs. According to the first one, the sentence's semantic value is either a mental representation or an ideal entity grasped in the subjective episode of understanding. Such a mental or ideal state of affairs holds if it has its real counterpart. The second account is based on the idea that real states of affairs constitutes a subclass of all describeable states of affairs. A given state of affairs holds if and only if it belongs to this special class. According to the third interpretation, a holding state of affairs is the semantic value of a true sentence. The author argues that the first account gives rise to the suspect question on the nature of either the relation of mental representation or the relation of exemplification. The second account, in turn, seems to require a controversial assumption that existence is a property. Taking into account those and similar problems, we have no alternative but to embrace the third option, according to which a given state of affairs holds because it is the semantic value of a true sentence. The truth of a sentence, in turn, has to be conceived as its rational acceptability. Wed Jun 01 2005 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek O pożytkach płynących z dzielenia włosa na czworo (On the Benefits of Splitting Hairs). Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Miesięcznik Społeczności Akademickiej, 3, 2005, 6-9. philosophy conceptual problems change freedom The article offers a defense of philosophical reflection against the charge of excessive pedantry, arguing that “splitting hairs” plays a crucial role in the intellectual vitality of Western culture. Philosophy is characterized as a form of inquiry distinguished by exceptional sensitivity to conceptual problems that arise outside philosophy, in domains such as science and political thought. By identifying and addressing these problems, philosophy develops new concepts that subsequently reshape non-philosophical practices. This thesis is illustrated through two historical case studies: the problem of change in early Greek philosophy and the problem of freedom in modern political theory. Together they show how philosophical problem-finding and conceptual innovation foster cultural dynamism and practical transformation. Sun Mar 20 2005 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Jakiej teorii prawdy relatywiści potrzebują (What Theory of Truth Relativists Need). Filozofia Nauki, 11(3-4), 2003, 115-126. theory of truth relativism deflationism about truth realist versus epistemic theories of truth The aim of this paper is to justify the claim that relativism assumes a deflationary account of truth. In the first section the author articulates some terminological conventions regarding the use of the terms <i>relativism</i> and <i>deflationism</i>. It is assumed that relativism advocates two theses. The first one is the thesis of relativity. It says that opinions adopted by members of some community depend on social or cultural factors determining their cognitive point of view. The second one is the thesis of symmetry. It claims that the idea of the absolute and objective correctness has no sense. In other words, the choice of a cognitive point of view cannot be objectively justified. Nevertheless, it can be explained by describing its social causes. Next, the author analyses the most popular deflationary views on truth. It is assumed that the most reliable form of deflationism is the so-called disquotational conception. According to the conception in question the meaning of a concept of truth is entirely captured by instances of the disquotational scheme: ‘S’ is true if and only if s. It is stressed that the instances of the scheme define the immanent notion of truth. The point is that the notion so defined can be predicated only on sentences one understands. In the second section the author develops the main argument of this paper. A few relativistic accounts of truth are analysed. It is argued that relativists have no alternative but to accept the deflationary account of truth. The main idea of the argument is that rejecting the notion of transcendent truth relativism makes the notion of truth empty and strictly immanent. In other words, it makes the notion deflationary. The third section contains some remarks on possible ways of arguing against relativism. Mon Sep 01 2003 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Deflacjonizm a element normatywny (Deflationism and Normative Element). Filozofia Nauki, 9(2), 2001, 101-121. theory of truth deflationis about truth normative element The author offers a critical analysis of the so called deflationary conception of truth. According to the conception in question, an adequate theory of truth contains nothing more than instances of a schema: ‘p’ is true iff p. In short, truth is a disquotation. After giving a brief presentation of main deflationary ideas, the author argues that deflationism conflicts with normative epistemology. In other words, being a form of naturalism, it leads to the elimination of the so called normative element from the philosophy of science. For example, deflationary conception of truth is not able to account for constitutive connections between normative ideas of truth and reliability. Fri Jun 01 2001 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
- Maciej Witek Frege i semantyka języka naturalnego (Frege and the Semantics of Natural Language). Prinicipia, 15, 1996, 177-190. Frege natural language semantics sense and reference compositionality truth-conditional semantics understanding and meaning In this paper, I examine Gottlob Frege’s semantic ideas and assess the extent to which they can be applied to the analysis of natural language. I focus on the remarkable fact that speakers are able to understand and produce potentially infinitely many novel sentences on the basis of a finite linguistic sample. Rather than engaging in a polemic about the adequacy of neo-Fregean semantics, my aim is to clarify the conceptual terrain for future discussion. To this end, I formulate three conditions that any semantic theory inspired by Frege should satisfy: the association of expressions with semantic values in an extensional context, the distinction between meaning and sense as two interdependent levels of semantic representation, and the determination of the semantic representation of complex expressions by that of their constituents. I discuss Frege’s theories of meaning and sense, relate them to Davidson’s truth-conditional semantics, and evaluate how well they account for compositionality and understanding in natural language. Sun Dec 01 1996 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
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