Searle, Burge and Intentional Content. In: J. C. Marek & M. E. Reicher (Eds.), Experience and Analysis. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, vol. XII, Kirchberg 2004, 413-415.

Abstract

This paper explores the internalist perspective on intentional content as advocated by John Searle, contrasting it with externalist viewpoints represented by philosophers like Tyler Burge and Kent Bach. Searle's internalism posits that the content of mental states is determined independently of external environmental factors, asserting that perceptual states and their satisfaction conditions are deeply linked to the agent's internal mental framework. The discussion culminates in an analysis of the implications of Searle's arguments for the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge, challenging whether internalism can coherently align with the notion of intuitive access to one's own mental states.