Między inferencjonizmem i antyinferencjonizmem: spór o naturę kompetencji komunikacyjnej po odkryciu zjawiska niedookreślenia językowego (Between Inferentialism and Anti-Inferentialism: The Dispute over the Nature of Communicative Competence after the Discovery of Linguistic Underdetermination). In: P. Stalmaszczyk, Metodologie językoznawstwa: Filozoficzne i empiryczne problemy w analizie języka, Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego 2010, 63-90.

Abstract

The chapter examines the debate between inferentialism and anti-inferentialism concerning the nature of communicative competence in light of the discovery of linguistic underdetermination. Starting from the post-Gricean paradigm, it argues that the semantic meaning of linguistic expressions is generally insufficient to determine what is said, and that primary interpretive processes must therefore involve pragmatic factors. The chapter distinguishes between primary and secondary processes of interpretation and asks whether both are inferential in nature. After outlining the phenomenon of linguistic underdetermination and its various forms, the author presents two inferentialist approaches—the theory of relevance and the expanded speech act schema—as well as two anti-inferentialist positions. The analysis shows that inferentialism offers a unified account of meaning determination but risks overgeneralizing inferential mechanisms, whereas anti-inferentialism provides a more differentiated picture of communicative competence by recognizing non-inferential pragmatic abilities. The chapter thus clarifies the theoretical stakes of the debate and its implications for contemporary pragmatics.