Akty mowy (Speech Acts). In: J. Odrowąż-Sypniewska (red.), Przewodnik po filozofii języka, Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM 2016, 367-412.

Abstract

This chapter introduces speech act theory as a philosophical approach that treats language primarily as a form of social action rather than mere description. It explains the distinction between illocutionary acts, which conventionally modify the normative positions of speakers and hearers, and perlocutionary acts, which concern the psychological and practical effects of utterances. After situating the study of speech acts at the intersection of philosophy of language and linguistic pragmatics, the chapter reconstructs J. L. Austin’s critique of the “descriptive fallacy” and his account of performatives, conditions of felicity, and the tripartite structure of speech acts. It then surveys major philosophical controversies concerning the nature of illocutionary acts, focusing on competing views that understand them as communicative, institutional, or interactional phenomena. The chapter concludes by assessing the theoretical role and explanatory value of illocutionary acts in philosophical and pragmatic analyses of language use.