Wittgenstein and the Internalism-Externalism Dilemma. In: W. Löffler & P. Weingartner (Eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, vol. XI, Kirchberg 2003, 374-376.

Abstract

It can be said that Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument initiated the internalism-externalism dilemma. In one of its interpretations the argument is read as a criticism of methodological solipsism. Internalism, in turn, assumes that methodological solipsism is an adequate account of mental content. Therefore some externalists refer to Wittgenstein as their forerunner. I argue, first, that the Private Language Argument does not support the claim of externalism that meanings are not in the head, even though it undermines methodological solipsism. I also claim that both internalism and externalism are not free from serious problems. Therefore we need a view that goes beyond the distinction in hand. To arrive at such a view I examine John Searle's account of mental content and argue that the real tension within the theory of content is between the first-person and the third-person point of view.