Jakie skojarzenia ma umysł obliczeniowy? W obronie tezy o informacyjnej izolacji systemu wczesnego widzenia (What Associations Does the Computational Mind Have? In Defence of the Thesis of Informational Encapsulation of the Early Visual System). Studia z Kognitywistyki i Filozofii Umysłu, 6(2), 2012, 67-82.

Abstract

In this paper, I defend the thesis of the informational encapsulation of the early vision system against objections that appeal to experiments allegedly showing that beliefs about the typical colours of objects influence the construction of shallow visual representations. By shallow visual representations I mean perceptual experiences that represent external stimuli solely in terms of such properties as shape, size, location, and colour. I argue that the experimental findings cited by opponents of informational encapsulation can be explained by a hypothesis according to which the early vision system constructs shallow visual representations by drawing on a local store of information about the typical colours of certain shapes, where this store takes the form of a network of associative links modified by experience. I also describe experiments by means of which this hypothesis could be tested.